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NOTE
IF YOU GIVE A MOUSE A COOKIE:
CALIFORNIA’S SECTION 11135 FAILS
TO PROVIDE PLAINTIFFS RELIEF IN

DARENSBURG v. METROPOLITAN
TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION

KATE BALDRIDGE*
INTRODUCTION
Transportation inequity is deeply rooted in American history. 1
While the civil rights movement 2 and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 3 formally outlawed racial segregation in transportation, remnants of
inequity are still evident in modern society. 4 Metropolitan transportation

* J.D. Candidate, Golden Gate University School of Law, 2013. I would like to thank
Professor Deborah Behles for her advice and support of my research. I would also like to thank the
Golden Gate University Law Review Editorial Board and Professor Ed Baskauskas for their
contributions to this Note. Finally, I want to express my sincere appreciation to Elizabeth Chase for
her everlasting patience and support.
1
In 1896, the United States Supreme Court held that maintaining “separate but equal”
railroad cars for African-American train passengers was constitutional. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S.
537, 550-51 (1896).
2
E.g., Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31, 33 (1962) (“We have settled beyond question that
no State may require racial segregation of interstate or intrastate transportation facilities.”).
3
See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000d (Westlaw 2012).
4
Many transportation inequities described by Dr. Martin Luther King in 1968 have not been
remedied by the passage of time:
Urban transit systems in most American cities, for example, have become a genuine civil
rights issue—and a valid one—because the layout of rapid-transit systems determines the
accessibility of jobs to the black community. . . . A good example of this problem is my
home city of Atlanta, where the rapid-transit system has been laid out for the convenience of
the white upper-middle-class suburbanites who commute to their jobs downtown.

7
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agencies across the nation are massively subsidizing the expansion of
inter-city rail systems that largely serve white, suburban commuters. 5
Meanwhile, these same agencies are disproportionately raising fares and
cutting services to inner-city bus systems that serve a mostly minority
ridership. 6 These funding allocations create a disparity not only between
inner-city riders and inter-city riders, but also between minority riders
and white riders. 7 Transportation equity is the new face of the
environmental justice movement, grounded in the belief that “the
benefits and burdens of transportation projects [should be] equally
distributed among various income levels.” 8
The discriminatory patterns one might expect to find in old southern
cities 9 are evident today even in the San Francisco Bay Area, despite its
characterization as having “liberal political attitudes” and a “culture of
tolerance.” 10 The Bay Area is somewhat unique among American cities
in that all socio-economic groups use public transit. 11 Even so, lowincome minority residents tend to depend more on public transit,
particularly the inner-city bus system, for their daily trips than do other
groups. 12
In Darensburg v. Metropolitan Transportation Commission, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit confronted these
issues of transportation inequity and the discriminatory effects
attributable to the disproportionate funding practices of metropolitan
transportation agencies. 13 A class composed of members of racial
minority groups (collectively the “plaintiffs”) alleged that the
MARTIN LUTHER KING, A TESTAMENT OF HOPE: THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF
MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 325-26 (James M. Washington ed., 1991).
5
Kevin L. Siegel, Discrimination in the Funding of Mass Transit Systems: Formulating a
Title VI Challenge to the Subsidization of the Alameda Contra Costa Transit District as Compared
to the Bay Area Rapid Transit District, 4 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 107 (1997).
6
Id.
7
Id.
8
Kevin J. Klesh, Note, Urban Sprawl: Can the “Transportation Equity” Movement and
Federal Transportation Policy Help Break Down Barriers to Regional Solutions?, 7 ENVTL. LAW.
649, 671 (2001) (citing Rich Stolz, Race, Poverty & Transportation, 9 POVERTY & RACE 1, 2
(Mar./Apr. 2000), available at www.prrac.org/newsletters/marapr2000.pdf).
9
Orlyn O. Lockard, III, Note, Solving the “Tragedy”: Transportation, Pollution and
Regionalism in Atlanta, 19 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 161, 180 n.139 (2000) (citing William Schmidt, Racial
Roadblock Seen in Atlanta Transit System, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 1987, at A16 (“The development of
a regional transit system in the Atlanta area is being held hostage to race, and I think it’s high time
we admitted it and talked about it.” (quoting J. David Chestnut, then-chairman of the Metropolitan
Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority))).
10
Darensburg v. Metro. Transp. Comm’n, 636 F.3d 511, 524 (9th Cir. 2011) (Noonan, J.,
concurring).
11
Siegel, supra note 5, at 114.
12
Id.
13
Darensburg, 636 F.3d at 514.
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Metropolitan Transportation Commission’s (MTC’s) practice of
persistently underfunding the Alameda-Contra Costa Transit (AC
Transit) inner-city bus system, while heavily investing in the Bay Area
Rapid Transit (BART) inter-city rail system, amounted to intentional
discrimination and had a disparate impact on low-income persons of
color. 14 The Ninth Circuit rejected the plaintiffs’ constitutional and
statutory claims, holding that MTC’s funding decisions did not
intentionally discriminate against, nor have a disparate impact on the
minority class. 15 In a concurring opinion, one judge went even further,
decrying the fact that the lawsuit was brought in the first place. 16
While courts continually narrow the reach of disparate-impact
litigation under federal law, 17 the California Legislature has expanded
the scope of its state antidiscrimination laws. 18 California has given
plaintiffs challenging institutional disparities a proverbial “cookie” by
providing a private right of action for disparate-impact discrimination,
but, ultimately, plaintiffs are denied their glass of milk by the
overwhelming evidentiary burdens required to substantiate these claims.
The burden-of-proof issues faced by plaintiffs in Darensburg illustrate
the uphill road ahead for future litigants challenging institutional
disparities still present in today’s “culture of tolerance.” 19
This Note examines Darensburg and the evidentiary problems faced
by plaintiffs entangled in the bus-versus-rail controversy that are inherent
to disparate-impact litigation. Part I discusses the factual background of
Darensburg and relevant federal and state law concerning claims of both
intentional and disparate-impact discrimination. Part II examines
disparate-impact jurisprudence in the context of the unequal distribution
of municipal services as background to the complexity of the issues
presented in Darensburg. Part III analyzes the Darensburg opinion in

14

Id.
Id. at 514-15.
16
Id. at 524 (Noonan, J., concurring) (“The notion of a Bay Area board bent on racist goals
is a specter that only desperate litigation could entertain.”).
17
Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 280 (2001) (“[I]t is . . . beyond dispute—and no
party disagrees—that § 601 prohibits only intentional discrimination.”); Save Our Valley v. Sound
Transit, 335 F.3d 932, 944 (9th Cir. 2003) (providing that section 601 does not create a right “to be
free from racially discriminating effects”).
18
See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 11135(a) (Westlaw 2012) (prohibiting intentional
discrimination); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, § 98101(i)(1) (Westlaw 2012) (prohibiting disparateimpact discrimination); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 11139 (Westlaw 2012) (providing a private right of
action to bring claims of disparate-impact discrimination).
19
Darensburg, 636 F.3d at 523-24 (Noonan, J., concurring) (“The twentieth century racial
categories so confidently deployed no longer correspond to American life among the young. What is
true of the young is already characteristic of the Bay Area where social change has been fostered by
liberal political attitudes, and a culture of tolerance.” (internal citation omitted)).
15
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light of that background and shows that the burden-of-proof issues faced
by plaintiffs are illustrative of the lack of effective guidance to plaintiffs
seeking relief from institutional disparities.
I.

BACKGROUND
A. FACTS AND HISTORY OF DARENSBURG V. MTC

The named plaintiff, Sylvia Darensburg, a low-income AfricanAmerican resident of East Oakland, relied on AC Transit bus service to
meet the transportation needs of herself and her family. 20 Increases in
transit fares since 2001 stretched her budget so tightly that she could not
pay other bills on time. 21 Because of the unreliable service AC Transit
provided, she was unable to accept or retain employment. 22 Cuts in
service required that she take two or three buses to reach her
destinations. 23 And due to the discontinuation of a service line near her
home, she had to walk long distances in bad neighborhoods at night on
her return home from college classes. 24 Darensburg represented a class
of minority patrons of AC Transit, all with similar stories. 25 Due to
funding shortfalls, AC Transit had been forced to cut urban bus service,
to the plaintiffs’ detriment. 26 Meanwhile, MTC’s long-term financial
plan for the allocation of federal and state subsidies for transportation
dedicated ninety-four percent of its $10.5 billion budget to new rail
projects, leaving only five percent to fund new bus projects. 27
The plaintiff class filed suit in federal court, alleging that defendant
MTC’s funding practices, though facially race-neutral, actually diverted
funding from AC Transit bus service to costly BART rail expansion
projects, resulting in disproportionate harm to AC Transit’s minority bus
ridership. 28 The plaintiffs’ first claim was based on Equal Protection.29

20

Second Amended Complaint at 6, Darensburg v. Metro. Transp. Comm’n, 611 F. Supp. 2d
994 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (No. C-05-01597 EDL), aff’d, 636 F.3d 511 (9th Cir. 2011), 2007 U.S. Dist.
Ct. Pleadings LEXIS 18425, at *8.
21
Darensburg, v. Metro. Transp. Comm’n, 611 F. Supp. 2d 994, 1001 (N.D. Cal. 2009),
aff’d, 636 F.3d 511 (9th Cir. 2011).
22
Id.
23
Second Amended Complaint at 6, Darensburg, 611 F. Supp. 2d 994 (No. C-05-01597
EDL), aff’d, 636 F.3d 511 (9th Cir. 2011), 2007 U.S. Dist. Ct. Pleadings LEXIS 18425, at *9.
24
Id.
25
Darensburg, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1001.
26
Id. at 1038.
27
Appellants’ Opening Brief at 19, Darensburg v. Metro. Transp. Comm’n, 636 F.3d 511
(9th Cir. 2011) (No. 09-15878), 2009 WL 6866035, at *11.
28
Darensburg, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 997.
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They alleged that MTC’s disparate funding allocations violated their
rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, because they had the purpose and effect of
discriminating against transit riders on the bases of race and national
origin. 30
The plaintiffs’ second claim alleged a violation of Title VI. 31 They
claimed that because MTC was a recipient of federal funds, and because
the allocations of those funds had the purpose and effect of
discriminating against transit riders on the bases of race and national
origin, MTC was acting in violation of section 601 of Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 32
The plaintiffs’ third claim was based on California Government
Code section 11135. 33 Like Title VI, section 11135 prohibits intentional
discrimination, but it goes further to prohibit disparate-impact
discrimination in state-funded programs and activities. 34 The plaintiffs
claimed that MTC’s funding allocations created a disparate impact
against transit riders on the bases of race, national origin, and ethnic
group identification, effectively denying the plaintiffs full and equal
access to public transportation. 35
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California
granted in part and denied in part MTC’s motions for summary
judgment, holding that there were triable issues of fact as to disparateimpact discrimination under California statutory law, but finding
insufficient evidence as to intentional discrimination under federal or
state law. 36 At trial, the district court found that the plaintiffs had
established a prima facie case of disparate-impact discrimination because
MTC’s process for prioritizing transportation funding in its long-range
plan caused “a disparity in funding for rail projects that on the whole are

29

Second Amended Complaint at 28-29, Darensburg, 611 F. Supp. 2d 994 (No. C-05-01597
EDL), 2007 U.S. Dist. Ct. Pleadings LEXIS 18425, at *55-56.
30
Id.
31
Second Amended Complaint at 29, Darensburg, 611 F. Supp. 2d 994 (No. C-05-01597
EDL), 2007 U.S. Dist. Ct. Pleadings LEXIS 18425, at *56-57.
32
Id.
33
Second Amended Complaint at 29-30, Darensburg, 611 F. Supp. 2d 994 (No. C-05-01597
EDL), 2007 U.S. Dist. Ct. Pleadings LEXIS 18425, at *57-58.
34
Danfeng Soto-Vigil Koon, Cal. Gov’t Code § 11135: A Challenge to Contemporary StateFunded Discrimination, 7 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 239, 241-42 (2011).
35
Second Amended Complaint at 29-30, Darensburg, 611 F. Supp. 2d 994 (No. C-05-01597
EDL), 2007 U.S. Dist. Ct. Pleadings LEXIS 18425, at *57-58.
36
Darensburg, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 998.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2013

5

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 5

12

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

used by a lower percentage of minority riders, as opposed to bus
projects.” 37
A prima facie case under section 11135 requires that a plaintiff
establish the occurrence of certain outwardly neutral practices that are
related to a significantly adverse or disproportionate impact on
Unlike intentional discrimination claims, proving
minorities. 38
disparate-impact discrimination does not require a showing of
discriminatory intent. 39 Plaintiffs may prevail by offering “statistical
evidence of a kind and degree sufficient to show that the practice in
question has caused the exclusion of [plaintiffs] because of their
membership in a protected group.” 40 Thus, the plaintiffs here bore the
initial burden of showing a disparate impact using some appropriate
measure that could adequately capture how they were treated differently
as members of a protected group. 41 The district court found that the
plaintiffs’ ridership statistics combined with the fact that MTC applied
wholly different funding criteria to bus projects than to rail projects 42
satisfied this burden by showing increased and disparate funding for rail
projects that, on the whole, are used by a lower percentage of minority
riders as compared to bus projects. 43
Once the plaintiffs met their burden to establish a prima facie case
regarding MTC’s long-range plan, the burden shifted to MTC to justify
its practices. 44 However, the appropriate standard for MTC’s rebuttal
burden was a point of contention between the parties. 45 The plaintiffs
argued for the “business necessity” rebuttal standard 46 originally

37

Id. at 1044. However, the court held that MTC’s apportionment of committed and
uncommitted funds did not constitute disparate-impact discrimination. Id. at 1051.
38
Id. at 1042 (citing Gamble v. City of Escondido, 104 F.3d 300, 306 (9th Cir. 1997)).
39
Id. (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971); Gamble, 104 F.3d at
306).
40
Id. (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994-95 (1988)).
41
Id.
42
Id. at 1043.
43
Id. at 1044.
44
Id. at 1051. The state burden-shifting framework for analyzing disparate-impact claims is
analogous to the framework under Title VI (imported from Title VII): (1) a plaintiff establishes a
prima facie case if the defendant’s facially neutral practice causes a disproportionate adverse impact
on a protected class; (2) to rebut, the defendant must justify the challenged practice; and (3) if the
defendant meets its rebuttal burden, the plaintiff may still prevail by establishing a less
discriminatory alternative. Darensburg v. Metro. Transp. Comm’n, 636 F.3d 511, 519 (9th Cir.
2011).
45
Darensburg, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1051.
46
Id. at 1051-52 (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); Albemarle Paper
Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975)).
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incorporated by reference into section 11135’s final regulations. 47 This
standard requires a defendant to prove that the challenged practice is
“necessary for safe and efficient operation of the business,” is related to
the stated business purpose, and cannot be replaced by an equally
effective but less discriminatory alternative. 48
This standard
demonstrates the California Legislature’s intent to provide broad
protections against discrimination. 49
Nevertheless, the district court rejected the business-necessity
standard and instead required that MTC justify its conduct only by a
“preponderance of competent, relevant evidence, which need not consist
of rigorous statistical studies as long as it is persuasive.” 50 The court
distinguished the cases relied on by the plaintiffs for the businessnecessity standard because they were employment discrimination cases
brought under Title VII concerning a “discrete practice,” which did not
readily translate to the facts in Darensburg because MTC’s practice
involved complex and multi-faceted decisions regarding differently
situated service operators. 51 The court reasoned that the more relaxed
“substantial legitimate justification” 52 standard was appropriate because
MTC was responsible for making policy and budgetary decisions within
a complex web of statutory, regulatory, and administrative constraints. 53
The court concluded that MTC met this burden by showing that its
funding decisions were based on existing funding constraints and the
legitimate goal of improving interconnectivity and convenience for all
transit riders. 54
47

Section 11135’s regulations incorporate by reference the definitions and prohibitions
contained in California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act’s (FEHA’s) implementing regulations.
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, § 98400 (Westlaw 2012). See Appellants’ Reply Brief at 26, Darensburg,
636 F.3d 511 (No. 09-15878), 2010 WL 3708467, at *19.
48
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, § 98400; see also id. tit. 2, § 7286.7(b) (“Business Necessity.
Where an employer or other covered entity has a facially neutral practice which has an adverse
impact (i.e., is discriminatory in effect), the employer or other covered entity must prove that there
exists an overriding legitimate business purpose such that the practice is necessary to the safe and
efficient operation of the business and that the challenged practice effectively fulfills the business
purpose it is supposed to serve. The practice may still be impermissible where it is shown that there
exists an alternative practice which would accomplish the business purpose equally well with a
lesser discriminatory impact.”).
49
See, e.g., id. tit. 22, § 98400 (incorporating FEHA regulations which require a business
necessity to overcome adverse impact).
50
Darensburg, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1054.
51
Id. at 1053. But see id. at 1040 (“[A] successful disparate impact claim must identify a
discrete practice.”).
52
The court imported the substantial legitimate justification standard from a transportation
case in the Second Circuit. Id. at 1053 (adopting the standard employed by the Second Circuit in
N.Y. Urban League v. N.Y., 71 F.3d 1031 (2d Cir. 1995) (per curiam)).
53
Id. at 1054.
54
Id. at 1057-58.
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The burden then shifted back to the plaintiffs to show by a
preponderance of the evidence that an equally effective, yet less
discriminatory, alternative existed. 55 The court held that while the
plaintiffs’ proffered alternatives held merit, they failed to meet their
burden of showing those alternatives to be equally effective while
causing less of a discriminatory impact. 56 Consequently, the plaintiffs’
prayer for relief against MTC was denied. 57
The plaintiffs appealed to the Ninth Circuit, arguing that the lower
court erred in applying the “substantial legitimate justification” standard
and that the complex and competing goals used to satisfy the standard
did not justify the court’s departure from the prevailing businessnecessity standard. 58 Rather than addressing the appropriate rebuttal
standard, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the judgment on entirely different
grounds. 59 It held that the statistical measure of disparity the plaintiffs
used was unsound, and it went even further by remarking that the
plaintiffs’ claim rested upon a “logical fallacy.” 60 The court of appeals
found that the district court’s finding of a prima facie case of disparateimpact discrimination was “clearly erroneous,” reasoning that the
plaintiffs’ general population statistics, offered to demonstrate the
disparity between minority bus riders and rail riders, failed to establish
that MTC’s funding practices favoring rail projects actually
disadvantaged minorities. 61
While conceding that the statistical evidence proffered by the
plaintiffs showed that minorities make up a greater percentage of bus
riders than rail riders, the court did not agree that it necessarily followed
that a rail expansion plan that took money from AC Transit would harm
its minority ridership. 62 The court faulted the plaintiffs’ theory because,
it reasoned, the plaintiffs had not considered that a rail expansion plan
could, in the alternative, actually help minority transit users. 63 Without a
precise measure of how future rail projects would eventually serve the
Bay Area’s transit ridership, the court declined to come to a conclusion
on whether rail-centered funding allocations would help or harm the

55

Id. at 1060-61.
Id. at 1061.
57
Id.
58
Appellants Opening Brief at 10, Darensburg v. Metro. Transp. Comm’n, 636 F.3d 511 (9th
Cir. 2011) (No. 09-15878), 2009 WL 6866035, at *2.
59
Darensburg, 636 F.3d at 514-15.
60
Id. at 514.
61
Id. at 522.
62
Id. at 514-15.
63
Id. at 515.
56

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol43/iss1/5

8

Baldridge: Darensburg v. Metropolitan Transportation Commission

2013] Darensburg v. Metropolitan Transportation Commission

15

minority ridership. 64 Because the court found error in the district court’s
finding of a prima facie case of disparate impact, it did not address the
burden-shifting framework used by the district court. 65
B. RELEVANT LAW
Because no legislation addresses transportation inequities
specifically, plaintiffs may use a variety of legal theories to fit their
case. 66 As was the case in Darensburg, those seeking redress for the
disproportionate distribution of municipal services often base their
claims on civil rights statutes grounded in Equal Protection. 67 In
addition, because metropolitan transportation agencies like MTC are the
recipients of both federal and state funding, plaintiffs may pursue Title
VI claims under federal law and equivalent claims under state law. 68
1. Federal Law
a. Equal Protection
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
provides the primary constitutional cause of action available to remedy
inequities. 69 The constitutional prohibition on disparate treatment in this
context prevents government actors from allocating environmental
benefits and burdens on racial grounds. 70 To prove a violation, plaintiffs
must show that persons who are similarly situated are being treated
differently (i.e., a disparate impact) and must also provide evidence of
intent to effectuate the discriminatory practice. 71 In the absence of direct
proof of intentional discrimination by government actors, courts have
been reluctant to infer intentional discrimination solely from evidence of
64

Id.
Id.
66
See generally Sten-Erik Hoidal, Note, Returning to the Roots of Environmental Justice:
Lessons from the Inequitable Distribution of Municipal Services, 88 MINN. L. REV. 193 (2003)
(describing the various legal tools available to environmental justice plaintiffs, including
environmental statutes, common-law property claims, constitutional challenges, and civil rights
laws).
67
Id. at 195.
68
Koon, supra note 34, at 241-42.
69
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (providing that no state shall “deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws”).
70
Hoidal, supra note 66, at 204.
71
See, e.g., Terry Props., Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 799 F.2d 1523, 1536 (11th Cir. 1986)
(finding no discriminatory intent in the siting of an industrial plant in a largely African-American
community).
65
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racially disparate impact. 72 The difficulty of meeting the intentional
discrimination burden has severely hampered plaintiffs pursuing this
remedy. 73
b. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
Rooted in Congress’s taxing and spending powers, Title VI
prohibits discrimination by recipients of federal funding. 74 In the context
of the disproportionate allocation of municipal services, sections 601 75
and 602 76 provide the relevant authority. Section 601 provides that “[n]o
person in the United States shall, on the grounds of race, color, or
national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance.” 77 Section 602 authorizes federal
agencies to create regulations to effectuate the goals of section 601 and
provides the means of enforcement. 78 For example, the Federal Transit
Administration’s (FTA’s) guidelines for carrying out the U.S.
Department of Transportation’s Title VI implementing regulations 79
provide that recipients of federal funds should “[e]nsure that the level
and quality of public transportation service is provided in a
nondiscriminatory manner” and “[p]romote full and fair participation in
public transportation decision-making without regard to race, color, or
national origin.” 80

72

See Bean v. Sw. Waste Mgmt. Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673, 680 (S.D. Tex. 1979) (holding that
plaintiffs failed to prove discriminatory intent, despite showing disparate impact of hazardous waste
facility siting); E. Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass’n v. Macon-Bibb Cnty. Planning & Zoning
Comm’n, 706 F. Supp. 880, 886 (M.D. Ga. 1989) (holding that plaintiffs failed to provide evidence
to support a determination that race was a motivating factor, despite strong evidence of disparate
impact); R.I.S.E., Inc. v. Kay, 768 F. Supp. 1144, 1149-50 (E.D. Va. 1991) (holding that plaintiffs
lacked the evidence necessary to show discriminatory intent, despite the existence of a disparate
impact on minorities).
73
Hoidal, supra note 66, at 204.
74
Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 463 U.S. 582, 598-99 (1983) (stating that Title
VI was enacted under Congress’s power to spend for the general welfare of the United States).
75
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000d (Westlaw 2012) (prohibiting intentional discrimination caused by
disparate treatment).
76
Id. § 2000d-1 (prohibiting discrimination resulting from policies and actions that have a
disparate impact on protected groups).
77
Id. § 2000d.
78
Id. § 2000d-1.
79
Nondiscrimination in Federally-Assisted Programs of the DOT—Effectuation of Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 49 C.F.R. pt. 21 (Westlaw 2012).
80
FED. TRANSIT ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., FTA C 4702.1B, TITLE VI REQUIREMENTS
AND GUIDELINES FOR FEDERAL TRANSIT ADMINISTRATION RECIPIENTS II-1 (2012), available at
www.fta.dot.gov/documents/FTA_Title_VI_FINAL.pdf.
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A successful claim under section 601 requires proof of
discriminatory intent. 81 Consequently, as with Equal Protection claims,
the majority of environmental justice claims alleging intentional
discrimination to date have failed. 82
Conversely, section 602 requires only a showing of disparateimpact discrimination. 83 However, there is no explicit private right of
action for plaintiffs to file suit under section 602. 84 Agency regulations
promulgated under section 602 may go further than the statute they
implement by “proscribing activities that have disparate effects on racial
groups, even though such activities are permissible under section 601,” 85
thus creating “considerable tension” between section 601 and disparateimpact regulations. 86
While the Supreme Court had numerous opportunities to address the
scope of Title VI’s reach, it did not decide until 2001 whether there
existed a private right of action to enforce agency disparate-impact
In Alexander v.
regulations promulgated under section 602. 87
Sandoval, 88 the Court answered the question in the negative and held that
there is no private right of action to enforce agency regulations, 89
81

Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 280 (2001) (“[I]t is . . . beyond dispute—and no
party disagrees—that § 601 prohibits only intentional discrimination.”); Save Our Valley v. Sound
Transit, 335 F.3d 932, 944 (9th Cir. 2003) (providing that section 601 does not create a right “to be
free from racially discriminating effects”).
82
See, e.g., cases cited supra note 72.
83
See Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 463 U.S. 582, 598-99 (1983) (upholding
administrative regulations implementing Title VI, which prohibit disparate-impact discrimination).
84
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000d-1 (Westlaw 2012); see also Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 288-89; Save Our
Valley, 335 F.3d at 944 (“The disparate-impact regulation cannot create a new right; it can only
“effectuate” a right already created by § 601. And § 601 does not create the right that [plaintiff]
seeks to enforce, the right to be free from racially discriminatory effects.”).
85
Save Our Valley, 335 F.3d at 935 n.2.
86
Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 282.
87
See Guardians, 463 U.S. 582; Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985); Cannon v. Univ.
of Chi., 441 U.S. 677 (1979); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
88
Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 275.
89
Id. at 285-89 (“It is clear now that the disparate-impact regulations do not simply apply §
601-since they indeed forbid conduct that § 601 permits-and therefore clear that the private right of
action to enforce § 601 does not include a private right to enforce these regulations.”) At least one
commentator has cogently argued that Sandoval was wrongly decided:
The Court’s implicit reasoning, based upon Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,
is unpersuasive because, contrary to Sandoval’s assertion, Bakke never held that there existed
clear congressional intent to limit the scope of Title VI to intentional discrimination.
Conversely, the Guardians Association v. Civil Service Commission-Alexander v. Choate
line of cases is incapable of standing for the proposition that disparate-impact regulations are
valid law. Rather, Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council provides the only
appropriate means of determining the validity of disparate-impact regulations. After working
through a Chevron analysis, it is apparent that the 88th Congress never expressed a clear and
unambiguous intent as to the scope of Title VI’s anti-discrimination mandate. Because the

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2013

11

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 5

18

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

effectively requiring Title VI plaintiffs to prove intentional
discrimination under section 601, or to seek redress under other laws.
Justice Stevens, dissenting, pointed to earlier case law 90 to show that
Sandoval was a sharp departure from precedent and that “[l]itigants who
in the future wish to enforce the Title VI regulations against state actors
in all likelihood must only reference [42 U.S.C.] § 1983 to obtain
relief.” 91
c. 42 U.S.C. § 1983
In the wake of Sandoval, many environmental justice plaintiffs were
successful in bringing section 602 disparate-impact claims under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 as Justice Stevens had suggested. 92 Section 1983 “allows
suits for violations of the Constitution and other federal laws against
persons acting under color of law.” 93 Because a violation of section 602
is a breach of federal law, it would follow that such a violation should be
actionable under § 1983. 94 Plaintiffs tried to use this logic to seek
redress under section 602, but the success of this approach was shortlived.
In South Camden Citizens in Action v. New Jersey Department of
Environmental Protection, the Third Circuit held that “Title VI does not
88th Congress did not precisely address whether “discrimination” embodied an intent or
effects standard, under the holding of the Court’s opinion in Chevron U.S.A., the judiciary
must defer to EPA’s permissibly constructed disparate-impact regulations[, which] therefore
remain[ ] valid federal law after Sandoval.
David J. Galalis, Note, Environmental Justice and Title VI in the Wake of Alexander v. Sandoval:
Disparate-Impact Regulations Still Valid Under Chevron, 31 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 61, 101
(2004). Judge Berzon of the Ninth Circuit also noted that Chevron deference to agency
interpretations of ambiguous statutes could help courts interpret the scope of statutory rights under §
1983, but she ultimately concluded that section 602 regulations did not establish an enforceable right
under § 1983 because of the Supreme Court’s clear direction in Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S.
273, 283 (2002), that only an explicit private right of action would support a cause of action under §
1983 in Spending Clause cases such as Title VI. Save Our Valley, 335 F.3d at 958-65 (Berzon, J.,
dissenting in part).
90
Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 299-300 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Guardians, 463 U.S. at 59899).
91
Id. at 300 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
92
See Bradford C. Mank, Using § 1983 To Enforce Title VI’s Section 602 Regulations, 49 U.
KAN. L. REV. 321 (2001); see also Robinson v. Kansas, 295 F.3d 1183, 1187 (10th Cir. 2002)
(indicating that disparate-impact claims may still be brought under § 1983); Langlois v. Abington
Hous. Auth., 234 F. Supp. 2d 33, 52-55 (D. Mass. 2002) (permitting a disparate-impact suit pursuant
to § 1983); White v. Engler, 188 F. Supp. 2d 730, 743-45 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (permitting claims
under § 1983 regarding the disbursement of education funds).
93
CLIFFORD RECHTSCHAFFEN, EILEEN GAUNA & CATHERINE A. O’NEILL, ENVIRONMENTAL
JUSTICE: LAW, POLICY & REGULATION 509 (2d ed. 2009); see also 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (Westlaw
2012).
94
RECHTSCHAFFEN, GAUNA & O’NEILL, supra note 93, at 493.
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establish a right to be free of disparate impact discrimination,” and to
hold that agency regulations promulgated under section 602 could
“constitute a ‘federal right’ enforceable under [§] 1983” would “give the
statute a scope beyond that [which] Congress contemplated.” 95 The
Supreme Court soon agreed and put an end to the use of § 1983 as a tool
to entertain section 602 disparate-impact claims. 96
State Law: California Government Code Section 11135

2.

The California Legislature has provided the means to allow
plaintiffs redress for discrimination under California Government Code
section 11135 and its implementing regulations. 97 This section is
analogous to Title VI in that it prohibits intentional discrimination 98 and
disparate-impact discrimination 99 in state-funded programs and
activities. California law is distinguishable from Title VI, however, in
that it explicitly provides a private right of action to enforce section
11135 and its regulations. 100
DISPARATE-IMPACT JURISPRUDENCE: PLAINTIFFS’ BURDEN OF
PROOF

II.

After Sandoval, plaintiffs must be able to state a claim of intentional
discrimination to bring a cause of action under Title VI. 101 If plaintiffs
cannot proffer evidence supporting that claim, or if the gravamen of the

95

S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 274 F.3d 771, 790-91 (3d Cir.

96

Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 286-87 (2002).
California Government Code section 11135 provides:

2001).
97

No person in the State of California shall, on the basis of race, national origin, ethnic group
identification, religion, age, sex, sexual orientation, color, genetic information, or disability,
be unlawfully denied full and equal access to the benefits of, or be unlawfully subjected to
discrimination under, any program or activity that is conducted, operated, or administered by
the state or by any state agency, is funded directly by the state, or receives any financial
assistance from the state.
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 11135(a) (Westlaw 2012).
98
Id. § 11135.
99
Section 11135’s regulations prohibit practices that “utilize criteria or methods of
administration that have the purpose or effect of subjecting a person to discrimination.” CAL. CODE
REGS. tit. 22, § 98101(i)(1) (Westlaw 2012).
100
See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 11139 (Westlaw 2012) (“This article and regulations adopted
pursuant to this article may be enforced by a civil action for equitable relief, which shall be
independent of any other rights and remedies.”); Blumhorst v. Jewish Family Servs. of L.A., 24 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 474, 480 (Ct. App. 2005) (recognizing the private right of action created by the
Legislature).
101
See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 280 (2001).
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complaint lies in a disparate impact resulting from government action
rather than an identifiable practice of discrimination, the claim will
fail. 102 The critical distinction in a plaintiff’s potential relief from
discriminatory effects is therefore contingent on the standard of proof
required to establish a prima facie case of either type of claim. The
California Legislature has provided a private right of action for claims
based solely on disparate impact under California law. 103 However, a
survey of disparate-impact jurisprudence reveals that even California’s
broadened protections may not effectively remedy the overarching
judicial reticence toward disparate-impact litigation. 104
Further, using the disparate-impact analysis outside of the
intentional discrimination framework “transform[s] essentially political
questions about economic allocation . . . into courtroom battles that
obscure, rather than illuminate, the choices that must be made.” 105 The
allocation of billions of dollars of state and federal funding requires the
institutional decisionmaker to navigate “the messy mass of facts, factors,
and guesses going into planning for regional transportation” 106 —a task
perhaps better-suited to the political arena than the courtroom. This
point is well-illustrated in Darensburg. 107
A. THE ROOTS OF THE DISPARATE-IMPACT ANALYSIS
The disparate-impact analysis was first adopted by the Supreme
Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Company, an employment discrimination
case brought under Title VII. 108 Prior to the passage of Title VII, Duke
Power explicitly restricted African-American employees to low-level,

102

See id.
See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 11139 (providing a private right of action to enforce the
disparate-impact regulations of California Government Code § 11135).
104
See, e.g., discussion infra Part II.C.1-2.
105
Todd B. Adams, Environmental Justice and the Limits of Disparate Impact Analysis, 16
T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 417, 418 (1999); see also Darensburg v. Metro. Transp. Comm’n, 636 F.3d
511, 523 (9th Cir. 2011) (Noonan, J., concurring) (“The American instinct to cast controversies into
a legal forum has been an American characteristic at least since Alexis de Tocqueville observed in
1835, ‘Scarcely any political question arises in the United States that is not resolved, sooner or later,
into a judicial question.’” (citing 1 TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 280 (Phillips Bradley
ed., Henry Reeve trans., rev. by Francis Bowen ed., 1945) (1898))).
106
Darensburg, 636 F.3d at 524 (Noonan, J., concurring).
107
Id.
108
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). However, Title VII did not explicitly
mention disparate-impact analysis until 1991. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, §
105, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e2(k) (Westlaw 2012). The Act essentially codified Griggs in response to the Court’s subsequent
lowering of that standard. See id.; Ward’s Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 659-60
(1989).
103
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low-paying jobs. 109 Following the passage of Title VII, Duke Power
traded its explicitly discriminatory policies for facially neutral testing
requirements that, according to plaintiffs, continued to effectively deny
African-American employees jobs for which they were qualified,
perpetuating racial segregation within the company. 110 The district and
appellate courts, however, found the policies valid under Title VII
because “there was no showing of racial purpose or invidious intent.” 111
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that “[d]iscriminatory
preference for any group, minority or majority, is precisely and only
what Congress has proscribed. What is required by Congress is the
removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment
when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of
racial or other impermissible classification.” 112 Therefore, the Court held
that Title VII “proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices
that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation,” or, in other words,
practices that result in a disparate impact. 113
The Supreme Court later described the operation of the disparateimpact analysis as “functionally equivalent to intentional
discrimination” 114 —“[t]he distinguishing features of the factual issues
that typically dominate in disparate impact cases do not imply that the
ultimate legal issue is different than in cases where . . . [the intentional
discrimination] analysis is used.” 115 However, this approach raises the
question of “whether disparate impact analysis should apply where
statistical studies show a disparate impact on minorities but the statistical
studies do not, for various reasons, give rise to an inference of intentional
discrimination.” 116 This question is especially important after Sandoval,
where the distinction between evidence of intentional discrimination and
disparate impact discrimination will determine whether a plaintiff’s
109

Griggs, 401 U.S. at 426-27.
Id. at 427, 431-32.
111
Id. at 429.
112
Id. at 431.
113
Id. After establishing that the policies had a disparate impact, the court moved on to the
second prong of the analysis, under which an employer has “the burden of showing that any given
requirement [resulting in a disparate impact] must have a manifest relationship to the employment in
question.” Id. at 432. Because Duke Power could not meet this burden, the Court never reached the
third prong of the disparate-impact analysis. The Court later articulated the third prong in Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moody, providing that if the defendant proved a business necessity for the challenged
practice, the plaintiff could still prevail by showing that a less discriminatory alternative existed.
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975).
114
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 987 (1988).
115
Id. It is important to note that Watson was decided prior to Sandoval. In the postSandoval world, this distinction is critical in determining whether plaintiffs will get their day in
court.
116
Adams, supra note 105, at 426.
110
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claims are litigable under Title VI. Yet, prior to Sandoval—and even in
California where section 11135 provides a private right of action for
disparate-impact discrimination—the lack of clarity between the two
standards serves to inhibit a plaintiff’s success under either theory. 117
B. THE IMPORTANCE OF STATISTICAL EVIDENCE
Titles VI and VII contain similar distinctions between intent and
impact in the context of prohibiting discrimination. Similarity also lies
in the fact that circumstantial evidence of impact may prove intent. 118
Because case law is far more developed under Title VII, courts often
look to that analytical model when construing Title VI. 119 Similarly,
“[i]n light of the parallel language of state and federal
[antidiscrimination] law[s],” the federal framework also guides
California disparate-impact analyses. 120 Therefore, as under Title VI, a
prima facie case of disparate-impact discrimination under section 11135
requires “(1) the occurrence of certain outwardly neutral practices, and
(2) a significantly adverse or disproportionate impact on persons of a
particular type produced by the defendant’s facially neutral acts or
practices.” 121
In a case in which a facially neutral practice is challenged, the
plaintiffs’ burden is to identify specific “practices that are allegedly
responsible for any observed statistical disparities.” 122 Plaintiffs must
then establish causation by presenting “statistical evidence of a kind and
degree sufficient to show that the practice in question has caused the
exclusion of [plaintiffs] because of their membership in a protected
group.” 123 This “formulation” has “never been framed in terms of any
rigid mathematical formula,” but the Supreme Court has “consistently
stressed that statistical disparities must be sufficiently substantial that

117

See, e.g., Darensburg v. Metro. Transp. Comm’n, 636 F.3d 511, 523 (9th Cir. 2011)
(“Plaintiffs’ failure to establish . . . discriminatory impact prevents any inference of intentional
discrimination.”).
118
See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977);
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
119
See, e.g., Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 463 U.S. 582 (1983).
120
E.g., City & Cnty. of S.F. v. Fair Emp’t & Hous. Comm’n, 236 Cal. Rptr. 716, 721-23
(1987) (using Title VII standards to analyze a claim under California’s Fair Employment and
Housing Act).
121
Pfaff v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 88 F.3d 739, 745 (9th Cir. 1996) (using Title
VII standards to analyze a claim under California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act).
122
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994 (1988).
123
Id. at 994-95.
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they raise such an inference of causation.” 124 Plaintiffs’ statistical
evidence must also reflect an “‘appropriate measure’ for assessing
disparate impact,” 125 as “[c]ourts [and] defendants [are not] obliged to
assume that plaintiffs’ statistical evidence is reliable.” 126 However, the
meaning of the terms “sufficiently substantial” and “appropriate
measure” are subject to disagreement, as courts have not clearly defined
either.
One commentator has suggested that societal change since Griggs
may explain why clear standards in this area are lacking. 127 For
example, “[i]n 1979, the Supreme Court was close to taking judicial
notice that racial discrimination had excluded African-Americans from
jobs in crafts throughout the country.” 128 Yet “[t]oday, many Supreme
Court Justices may view society as less pervasively racist, as well as be
more skeptical of statistics.” 129 Thus, “[a] fundamental disagreement
over the role of disparate impact analysis . . . with respect to societal
discrimination probably hindered the articulation of a consistent
underlying model.” 130 This disagreement is evident in Supreme Court
precedent 131 and in the legislative history and text of the Civil Rights Act
of 1991. 132

124

Id. at 995 (emphasis added) (citing Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425
(1975) (hiring practices that “select applicants for hire or promotion in a racial pattern significantly
different from that of the pool of applicants”); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 246-47 (1976)
(hiring “practices disqualifying substantially disproportionate numbers of blacks”); Dothard v.
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977) (hiring practices that “select applicants for hire in a
significantly discriminatory pattern”); N.Y.C. Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 584 (1979)
(“statistical evidence showing that an employment practice has the effect of denying the members of
one race equal access to employment opportunities”); Conn. v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 446 (1982)
(“significantly discriminatory impact”)).
125
Darensburg v. Metro. Transp. Comm’n, 636 F.3d 511, 519 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting N.Y.C.
Envtl. Justice Alliance v. Giuliani, 214 F.3d 65, 69 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing N.Y. Urban League v.
N.Y., 71 F.3d 1031, 1038 (2d Cir. 1995) (per curiam))).
126
Watson, 487 U.S. at 996.
127
Adams, supra note 105, at 432. The author argued that “viewing disparate impact analysis
as a sophisticated from of ‘pretext analysis’ better harmonizes the evolving law and explains the
judicial reluctance to extend the doctrine into certain areas.” Id. at 418 (internal citations omitted).
128
Id. at 432 (citing United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 198 n.1 (1979)).
129
Id. (citing Johnson v. Santa Clara Cnty. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 664-66 (1987)); cf.
Darensburg, 636 F.3d at 523-24 (Noonan, J., concurring) (“What is true of the young is already
characteristic of the Bay Area where social change has been fostered by liberal political attitudes,
and a culture of tolerance. An individual bigot may be found, perhaps even a pocket of racists. The
notion of a Bay Area board bent on racist goals is a specter that only desperate litigation could
entertain.”).
130
Adams, supra note 105, at 432.
131
Id. (citing McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 806 (1973); United
Steelworkers, 443 U.S. at 218 (1979) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265, 348-50 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); Johnson, 480 U.S.
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In the absence of any “rigid mathematical formula” 133 or
articulation of a model disparate-impact analysis, case law may serve as
a guide in proving disparate-impact discrimination. 134 However, the lack
of significant case law outside of the employment context leads to varied
results, 135 and this variation often hinders plaintiffs’ claims of
institutional disparate-impact discrimination. 136 Absent clear evidentiary
standards, the evidentiary burden plaintiffs face in proving a prima facie
case of disparate-impact discrimination may serve only as an
“evidentiary dragnet” designed to “smoke[] out” instances of hidden—
but deliberate—intentional discrimination rather than to “dismantle racial
hierarchies” alleged in cases such as Darensburg. 137
C. STATISTICAL EVIDENCE IN PRACTICE: ILLUSTRATING THE
BENEFITS AND BURDENS OF INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS
Pre-Sandoval cases involving disparate-impact claims brought by
aggrieved plaintiffs claiming unequal distribution of funds between bus
and rail illustrate the evidentiary burdens faced by plaintiffs challenging
institutional disparities in this context and provide background for the
court’s analysis in Darensburg. The first two cases involved claims that

at 659-60 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting)); see also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541
(2011).
132
Adams, supra note 105, at 432 (citing Symposium, The Civil Rights Act of 1991,
Unraveling the Controversy, 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 887 (1993)); Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L.
No. 102-166, § 105, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); 42
U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(k) (Westlaw 2012).
133
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 995 (1988).
134
However, a survey in this area of law may leave one wondering if the appropriate standard
is that articulated by Justice Stewart in defining “hard-core pornography”: “I know it when I see it.”
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 196 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
135
The standards articulated under Title VII do not easily translate to analyses outside of the
employment discrimination context. For example, a prima facie case of discrimination under Title
VII requires the plaintiff to establish (1) his or her membership in a protected class, (2) his or her
qualification for the position, (3) an adverse employment action, and (4) circumstances giving rise to
an inference of discrimination on the basis of membership in the protected class. McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
136
For example, although the Supreme Court has never ruled on whether Title VIII includes a
disparate-impact standard, the circuits have agreed that it does apply in the housing context. See
John F. Stanton, The Fair Housing Act and Insurance: An Update and the Question of Disability
Discrimination, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 141, 174 (2002) (“[V]irtually every jurisdiction has held that
the ‘disparate impact’ discrimination analysis is appropriate in FHA cases.”). However, the circuits
disagree on whether Title VI’s burden-shifting framework or the balancing test utilized in early Title
VIII cases is appropriate. Compare Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 147-48 (3d Cir.
1977) (utilizing Title VI’s burden-shifting framework), with NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844
F.2d 926, 940 (2d Cir. 1988) (utilizing a balancing test).
137
See Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 HARV.
L. REV. 493, 520-21 (2003) (describing competing constructions of disparate-impact discrimination).
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the distribution of federal subsidies and fare structures had a disparate
impact on racial minorities in low-income neighborhoods. 138 The third
case involved a claim alleging both discriminatory intent and impact. 139
Although this third case was resolved through settlement, the resulting
consent decree withstood appeals both before and after Sandoval, and the
case is therefore “the best example that Title VI, . . . though wounded,
[is] not dead.” 140 However, a case arising post-Sandoval involving both
discriminatory intent and impact, including a section 11135 claim, shows
that while Sandoval may have foreclosed disparate-impact claims under
Title VI, the analysis under section 11135 remains the same—only the
forum has changed to litigate these claims. 141
1. Pre-Sandoval Bus-Versus-Rail Disparate-Impact Cases
In New York Urban League v. New York, plaintiffs challenged the
State of New York’s and the Metropolitan Transportation Authority’s
(MTA’s) allocation of funds for mass transit. 142 Plaintiffs alleged that
riders of the New York City Transit Authority (NYCTA) subway and
bus systems, “the majority of whom are members of protected minority
groups, pay a higher share of the cost of operating the system than
commuter line passengers who are predominantly white.” 143 The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the district court’s
grant of a preliminary injunction barring the implementation of a twenty
percent fare increase for riders of the NYCTA subway and bus
systems. 144 The district court had concluded that the “plaintiffs had

138

N.Y. Urban League v. N.Y., 71 F.3d 1031, 1033 (2d Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (finding
favoritism for suburbanite users of rail a rational exercise of transit system’s business judgment);
Comm. for a Better N. Phila. v. Se. Penn. Transp. Auth., No. 88-1275, 1990 WL 121177, at *1 (E.D.
Pa. Aug. 14, 1990), aff’d mem., 935 F.2d 1280 (3d Cir. 1991) (recognizing such disparities but not
finding them actionable).
139
Labor/Cmty. Strategy Center v. L.A. Cnty. Metro. Transp. Auth., No. CV-94-05936 TJH
(CMX) (C.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 1996), aff’d, 263 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2001).
140
Eric Mann, Los Angeles Bus Riders Derail the MTA, in HIGHWAY ROBBERY:
TRANSPORTATION RACISM & NEW ROUTES TO EQUITY 33, 33 (Robert D. Bullard et al. eds., 2004).
However, the current climate illustrates that the long-term success of litigation in this area may be
called into question. See Sunyoung Yang, Unprecedented Findings of Civil Rights Violations in
Federal Audit of Los Angeles Metro, BUS RIDERS UNION (Dec. 13, 2011),
www.thestrategycenter.org/blog/2011/12/13/unprecedented-findings-civil-rights-violations-federalaudit-los-angeles-metro.
141
Comm. Concerning Cmty. Improvement v. City of Modesto, No. CV-F-04-6121 LJO
DLB, 2007 WL 2408495, at *1-2 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2007), vacated in part, 583 F.3d 690 (9th Cir.
2009).
142
N.Y. Urban League, 71 F.3d at 1033.
143
Id.
144
Id.
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made a prima facie showing that the proposed fare increases, taken
together, would have a disparate impact upon members of protected
minority groups.” 145
The Second Circuit disagreed, holding that the district court had
“focused on the proposed NYCTA fare increase without examining the
broader financial and administrative context in which the fare increase
was adopted.” 146 A distinguishing factor in the case was that New York
state law commanded the allocation of subsidies between NYCTA and
commuter lines and that both systems were required to be selfsustaining—that is, when faced with operating shortfalls due to the
state’s or city’s withholding of funds from NYCTA, the agency was
forced to respond in some manner, be it through raising fares or cutting
services. 147 Therefore, many of NYCTA’s decisions were not as
discretionary as they appeared in the plaintiffs’ statistical evidence.
The appellate court faulted the district court’s finding that the
plaintiffs had made a prima facie showing of disparate impact based
“upon a comparison of the so-called ‘farebox recovery ratios’ of the
NYCTA and the commuter lines.” 148 The farebox recovery ratio
quantifies the percentage of each system’s operating costs recovered
through fare revenues. 149 The Second Circuit did not fault the level of
significance of the disparity established through that measure, but rather
the use of the measure itself. 150 The court held that because the essence
of the plaintiffs’ claim was based on the total allocation of subsidies to
the systems, the farebox recovery ratio could not “adequately capture the
impact of these subsidies upon NYCTA and commuter line
passengers.” 151
The court concluded that the farebox recovery ratio was not a
sufficient basis for a finding of disparate impact, in part because it failed
to “reveal the extent to which one system might have higher costs
associated with its operations—costs stemming from different
145

Id. at 1037.
Id. at 1033.
147
Id. at 1037.
148
Id. The court noted that the district court appeared to have accepted the farebox recovery
ratio as a measure of disparate impact “simply because the MTA records this statistic.” Id. at 1038.
The parties argued as to why MTA records farebox recovery ratios, with plaintiffs suggesting the
statistics were kept to track the percentage of costs allocated to users of each system, while MTA
provided that the statistics were used to measure operating efficiency rather than disparities in
subsidization. Id.
149
Id. at 1037.
150
Id. at 1037-38. The district court found that the NYCTA fare increase would lead to a
“significant” increase in the farebox recovery ratio of the subway and bus systems at 12.6%, as
compared to a much smaller increase in the commuter lines’ ratios—around 2%. Id. at 1037.
151
Id. at 1037.
146
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maintenance requirements, schedules of operation, labor contracts, and
so on.” 152 Further, the fundamental differences in the operation of each
transportation system and their relative costs foreclosed any assumption
that each system’s expenses bore any “proportionate relationship” and
could “obscure the level of subsidies to each,” leaving the court to
conclude that the “farebox recovery ratio itself [was] insufficient to
support a conclusion that the total allocation of subsidies ha[d] a
disparate impact upon minority NYCTA riders.” 153
Another pre-Sandoval case, Committee for a Better North
Philadelphia v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority,
involved a similar claim of unequal distribution of subsidies between
inter-city bus (City Transit) and intra-city commuter rail (Regional Rail)
services operated by the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation
Authority (SEPTA). 154 Plaintiffs alleged that SEPTA used an “unfair
portion of its subsidy dollars in Regional Rail at the expense of City
Transit,” which had a higher percentage of African-American riders than
did Regional Rail. 155 Plaintiffs argued that SEPTA’s system of “crosssubsidization” resulted in City Transit riders paying “a higher percentage
of that division’s operating budget,” resulting in a disparate impact to
minority riders. 156
SEPTA conceded that City Transit had a higher percentage of
African-American riders than Regional Rail and that City Transit fares
would have been lower had it “allocated the subsidies available to it in
direct proportion to the passenger fare revenues rather than in response to
operating deficits of its individual divisions.” 157 SEPTA argued,
however, that cross-subsidization was necessary in order to balance its
budget while increasing Regional Rail ridership to boost revenues. 158
The court agreed this was a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for
SEPTA’s disproportionate allocation of subsidies. 159 The court held that
plaintiffs failed to meet their burden to show an equally effective yet less
discriminatory alternative because plaintiffs “oversimplifie[d] the

152

Id. at 1038.
Id.
154
Comm. for a Better N. Phila. v. Se. Penn. Transp. Auth., No. 88-1275, 1990 WL 121177,
at *1 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 14, 1990), aff’d mem., 935 F.2d 1280 (3d Cir. 1991). While this case was
analyzed under the pre-Civil Rights Act of 1991 evidentiary structure, it does not affect the
plaintiffs’ initial evidentiary burden as discussed herein. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2 (Westlaw
2012).
155
Comm. for a Better N. Phila., 1990 WL 121177, at *1.
156
Id.
157
Id. at *3.
158
Id.
159
Id.
153
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objectives of SEPTA” as it had the “responsibility for operating an
integrated mass transit system throughout the five county area while
maintaining a balanced budget,” which required “responses to the
economic realities of a diversified transportation business.” 160 The court
characterized the “action [as] nothing more [than] an attack on the
business judgment of SEPTA,” and granted summary judgment to
defendants. 161
In Labor/Community Strategy Center v. Los Angeles County
Metropolitan Transportation Authority, 162 a group of bus passengers
challenged the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation
Authority’s (LACMTA’s) choice to “spend several hundred million
dollars on a new rail line,” while neglecting “overcrowding problems on
city buses” and “increase[d] bus fares” while eliminating discounted
monthly passes. 163 Plaintiffs alleged LACMTA “was spending a
disproportionately large portion of its budget on rail lines and suburban
bus systems that would primarily benefit white suburban commuters,
while intentionally neglecting inner-city and transit-dependent minority
bus riders who relied on the city bus system.” 164 LACMTA’s CEO
“openly acknowledged” the “fact that separate, unequal, and secondclass service was being provided to an inner-city bus ridership comprised
overwhelmingly of people of color.” 165
The bus-versus-rail controversy in Los Angeles began in the 1970’s,
peaking with the plaintiffs’ decade-long legal fight against the
LACMTA, 166 and arguably is not yet over. 167 Plaintiffs’ first legal
victory was the issuance of a six-month temporary restraining order
halting bus fare increases intended to fund rail projects, which also
served as an impetus to settlement discussions between the plaintiffs and

160

Id.
Id. at *3 n.10, *4.
162
Labor/Cmty. Strategy Center v. L.A. Cnty. Metro. Transp. Auth., No. CV-94-05936 TJH
(CMX) (C.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 1996), aff’d, 263 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2001).
163
Labor/Cmty. Strategy Ctr. v. L.A. Cnty. Metro. Transp. Auth., 263 F.3d 1041, 1043 (9th
Cir. 2001) (affirming district court’s remedial order after LACMTA failed to comply with the
consent decree).
164
Id.
165
Mann, supra note 140, at 39.
166
Id. at 34, 36.
167
See, e.g., Press Release, Bus Riders Union, New Study Finds MTA Policies Squeezing
Transit
Riders
at
Both
Ends
(Feb.
24,
2011),
available
at
www.thestrategycenter.org/blog/2011/02/24/new-study-finds-mta-policies-squeezing-transit-ridersboth-ends; Memorandum from Peter Rogoff, Administrator, Federal Transit Administration, to
Arthur Leahy, Chief Executive Officer, LACMTA (Apr. 23, 2012), available at
www.fta.dot.gov/printer_friendly/12328_14553.html.
161
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LACMTA. 168 When those initial settlement discussions failed, plaintiffs
filed a class action alleging that LACMTA “intentionally discriminated
against poor minority bus riders, and that their actions had a
discriminatory impact on poor people of color.” 169 After two years of
discovery, and shortly before the trial was set to begin, the parties
reached a settlement through a comprehensive consent decree aimed at
The LACMTA arguably conceded to
improving bus service. 170
plaintiffs’ demands in order “to avoid having a finding of racial
discrimination entered against them,” given that the plaintiffs’ evidence
included both damning statistics of disparity 171 and the overtly
discriminatory practices of the agency. 172 The resulting ten-year,
multibillion-dollar consent decree was the largest settlement in civil
rights history. 173
2. Post-Sandoval: Only the Forum Has Changed
Another case of interest involving a section 11135 claim that arose
post-Sandoval shows that, in practical effect, Sandoval did not change
anything in relation to burdens of proof. In Committee Concerning
Community Improvement v. City of Modesto, the plaintiffs brought
federal and state-law claims based on discrimination with regard to the
unequal distribution of municipal services. 174 The plaintiffs alleged that

168

Mann, supra note 140, at 39.
TIM CRESSWELL, ON THE MOVE: MOBILITY IN THE MODERN WESTERN WORLD 168
(2006). Plaintiffs presented the following statistics:
169

Although almost 94% of the MTA’s riders are bus riders and 80% of them are people of
color, MTA spends only 30% of its resources on buses. A typical MTA rider is a woman of
color, in her twenties, with a household income under $15,000 and no car available to use in
lieu of public transit, according to the MTA’s own studies. In sharp contrast, the MTA
spends 70% of its resources on rail, which carries only 6% of its riders and serves a
disproportionately white ridership.
Id.
170

Labor/Cmty. Strategy Ctr. v. L.A. Cnty. Metro. Transp. Auth., 263 F.3d 1041, 1043 (9th
Cir. 2001).
171
Mann, supra note 140, at 40.
172
Id. at 39.
173
Sean B. Seymore, Set the Captives Free! Transit Inequity in Urban Centers, and the Laws
and Policies Which Aggravate the Disparity, 16 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 57, 82 (2005).
LACMTA dragged its feet in complying with the consent decree, was found out of compliance at
many of the settlement milestones, and continued to fight the validity of the consent decree. Mann,
supra note 140, at 43. However, the court-appointed Special Master, the district court, and the Ninth
Circuit upheld the consent decree and the U.S. Supreme Court rejected LACMTA’s final appeal. Id.
174
Comm. Concerning Cmty. Improvement v. City of Modesto, No. CV-F-04-6121 LJO
DLB, 2007 WL 2408495, at *1-2 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2007), vacated in part, 583 F.3d 690 (9th Cir.
2009).
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over the preceding fifty years, the City of Modesto had grown steadily by
annexing certain predominantly white residential developments and
leaving predominantly Latino neighborhoods unincorporated. 175 This
left residents of unincorporated (and largely Latino) neighborhoods
without adequate infrastructure (i.e., without sidewalks, proper sewage,
and effective law enforcement). 176 Plaintiffs alleged that Latinos living
in these unincorporated neighborhoods were being discriminated against
and had suffered disproportionate harm as a result of the municipality’s
annexation and funding decisions. 177
The district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ § 1983 and Title VI
claims for failure to show discriminatory intent. 178 In this regard,
Modesto paralleled the lower court’s decision in Darensburg. 179
However, rather than ruling on the merits of the state-law claims, as the
court did in Darensburg, the court in Modesto declined to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the section 11135 claim, dismissing the
claim without prejudice. 180 The court explained that a showing of
“intentional discrimination is not required for proof of a section 11135
claim, which may be proved by disparate impact,” and “while the state
and federal claims [arose] from the same set of operative facts, the proof
of the federal claims versus the state claims is entirely different.” 181 A
decision on the state-law claims would have thus required “statutory
construction or interpretation,” better left to state courts, where the level
of proof for disparate-impact claims had not yet been addressed. 182
Further, the court noted that “[a]ny decisions this [c]ourt would make on
the state claims [would be] unnecessary because federal claims no longer
exist[ed] in this action” 183 and the claim therefore “should be resolved by
a state court.” 184
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court in part and
reversed and remanded in part. 185 The court reversed and remanded the
district court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ intentional discrimination
175

Third Amended Complaint at 6, Comm. Concerning Cmty. Improvement v. City of
Modesto, No. CIV-F-04-6121 LJO DLB (E.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2007), 2007 WL 969224.
176
Id. at 2.
177
Id. at 2-3.
178
Comm. Concerning Cmty. Improvement, 2007 WL 2408495, at *8.
179
Darensburg v. Metro. Transp. Comm’n, 611 F. Supp. 2d 994, 998 (N.D. Cal. 2009), aff’d,
636 F.3d 511 (9th Cir. 2011).
180
Comm. Concerning Cmty. Improvement, 2007 WL 2408495, at *8.
181
Id.
182
Id.
183
Id.
184
Id.
185
Comm. Concerning Cmty. Improvement v. City of Modesto, 583 F.3d 690, 715 (9th Cir.
2009).
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claims relating directly to annexation. 186 Those claims were based on the
exclusion of plaintiffs’ neighborhoods from the Master Tax Sharing
Agreement (MTSA) between the city and county—the plaintiffs argued
that their exclusion disincentivized infrastructure projects in their
neighborhoods and foreclosed the possibility their neighborhoods would
be annexed in the future. 187 The Ninth Circuit held that evidence of
“gross statistical disparities” may be used to satisfy the intent
requirement of a Title VI claim where the evidence “tends to show that
some invidious or discriminatory purpose underlies the policy.”188
Though statistical evidence of discriminatory impact alone does not
prove intent to discriminate, it, along with supporting circumstantial
evidence, may be “considered in determining whether there is evidence
of intent or purpose to discriminate.” 189 In reversing the district court,
the Ninth Circuit held that the statistical evidence presented by the
plaintiffs, along with other circumstantial factors, provided “evidence of
discriminatory impact which . . . created a sufficient inference of
discriminatory intent to permit [the plaintiffs] to present their MTSA
claim to a fact-finder.” 190
In support of their MTSA claim, the plaintiffs in Modesto presented
“statistical evidence comparing the ethnicity of the population in the . . .
neighborhoods excluded by the MTSA to those covered by the
MTSA.” 191 These statistics showed that non-annexed neighborhoods
that were excluded from the MTSA were seventy-one percent Latino,
while those included were forty-eight percent Latino. 192 The court found
“[t]he differences in the proportions of Latinos in the areas excluded and
included [were] statistically significant.” 193
The district court rejected this evidence, faulting the statistical
comparisons made by the plaintiffs as failing to provide an appropriate
measure for assessing disparate impact. 194 Concluding that “plaintiffs’
statistics [did] not account for the total Latino population of the
186

Id. at 716.
Id. at 697. Unrelated to the quality of the evidence presented, the Ninth Circuit reversed
the district court’s holding that the MTSA claim was time-barred and that plaintiffs could use timebarred MTSAs “as evidence to establish motive and to put [their] timely-filed claims in context.” Id.
at 702 (citation omitted).
188
Id. at 703 (citing Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307-08 (1997);
Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-66 (1977)).
189
Comm. Concerning Cmty. Improvement, 583 F.3d at 703.
190
Id. at 705.
191
Id. at 703.
192
Id. at 703-04.
193
Id. at 703.
194
Comm. Concerning Cmty. Improvement v. City of Modesto, No. CV-F-04-6121 LJO
DLB, 2007 WL 1456142, at *10-12 (E.D. Cal. May 16, 2007), rev’d, 583 F.3d 690 (9th Cir. 2009).
187
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unincorporated areas,” the court held that plaintiffs “selectively
analyze[d] the Latino population within each of the three impacted
county islands, but [did] not adequately statistically analyze the Latino
population in relation to either the total population or total Latino
population.” 195
The Ninth Circuit found however, that the district court’s reference
to “the total Latino population” was unclear because the “[p]laintiffs did
compare the total Latino population in the excluded areas to the total
Latino population in the included areas.” 196 The court noted that
“plaintiffs compared the total non-Latino population of the excluded
areas to the total non-Latino population of the included areas and found
that . . . the MTSA included more non-Latinos than it excluded.” 197 The
court also faulted the defendants’ contention that these statistics were
“inconsequential” because they also included white residents. 198 The
court found no “precedent for conducting this type of withinneighborhood analysis; as the question is whether particular islands have
been excluded because of their racial composition, the type of island-toisland comparison conducted by plaintiffs is appropriate.” 199 Therefore,
the court held, these statistics combined with other non-statistical
evidence should not have been dismissed at the summary judgment
stage. 200
The Ninth Circuit also noted that the district court “did not
conclude, as a matter of law, that plaintiffs had not shown disparate
impact.” 201 Rather, in analyzing plaintiffs’ federal claims the district
court ruled that, even assuming the statistics showed a disparate impact,
they “did not give rise to an inference of intentional discrimination.”202
Interestingly, although the district court rejected “plaintiffs’ statistical
evidence in the course of analyzing the MTSA claim under equal
protection, it did find, in the course of analyzing plaintiffs’ companion
[section] 11135 claim, that plaintiffs had presented some evidence of
disparate impact” and “that it could not ‘conclude as a matter of law, that
a reasonable jury would be unable to find disparate impact.’” 203

195
196

Id. at *10.
Comm. Concerning Cmty. Improvement v. City of Modesto, 583 F.3d 690, 704 (9th Cir.

2009).
197

Id.
Id.
199
Id.
200
Id.
201
Id. at 705.
202
Id.
203
Id. (citing Comm. Concerning Cmty. Improvement v. City of Modesto, No. CV-F-04-6121
LJO DLB, 2007 WL 1456142, at *19 (E.D. Cal. May 16, 2007)). However, the district court ruled
198
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The Ninth Circuit upheld dismissal of the claims related to sewage
services, finding that “sewer services [were] provided to only 3 of the 26
unincorporated
islands,”
including
statistically
non-minority
unincorporated islands, therefore finding the statistical evidence failing
to show a disparity and “insufficient to give rise to an inference of
discriminatory intent.” 204
However, regarding the claims alleging lack of effective law
enforcement, the Ninth Circuit found that a difference in dispatch and
response times of one to two minutes between plaintiffs’ neighborhoods
and majority-white islands was “statistically significant.” 205 The court
would not conclude “as a matter of law” that even “a difference of one
minute can be characterized as not making a ‘meaningful difference’
when one is waiting at one’s home for law-enforcement or emergency
personnel to arrive, particularly in the absence of any explanation for
why the time difference exists.” 206 The court remanded the issue to the
district court to decide whether the difference was “explainable on
grounds other than the ethnicity of the population of the
neighborhoods.” 207
The Ninth Circuit found the district court’s dismissal of the section
11135 claims “assuredly reasonable” and not “an abuse of discretion,”
but noted that the dismissal was intertwined with the dismissal of the
federal-law claims. 208 Otherwise, the Ninth Circuit did not comment on
the district court’s inference that disparate-impact claims under state law
would be entirely different than those under federal law and thus best
resolved by a state court. The Ninth Circuit reinstated and remanded the
section 11135 claims in case the district court was more inclined to
exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over those claims along with the
federal claims it remanded. 209 However, the Ninth Circuit noted that if
the district court were to dismiss the state-law claims again it would not
necessarily be an abuse of discretion. 210 That question was never
answered by the district court, however, because shortly after the Ninth
Circuit’s decision the parties entered into a settlement agreement that

that the disparate-impact claim under section 11135 was time-barred. Comm. Concerning Cmty.
Improvement, 2007 WL 1456142, at *19. Having concluded the claims not to be time-barred, the
Ninth Circuit reversed. Comm. Concerning Cmty. Improvement, 583 F.3d at 705.
204
Comm. Concerning Cmty. Improvement, 583 F.3d at 707.
205
Id. at 709.
206
Id.
207
Id.
208
Id. at 715.
209
Id.
210
Id.
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included “commitments by the city and County to support future
annexation efforts by the plaintiff neighborhoods.” 211
Two clear patterns emerge from the above cases—the importance of
an “appropriate measure” of disparity, and the question of whether that
measure presents a “significantly discriminatory impact” to establish a
prima facie case of disparate-impact discrimination.
As one
commentator observed, “The small universe of Title VI litigation appears
to indicate that, when courts determine disparity, it is appropriate to
measure the racial proportionality of the allegedly affected population
against the population of the defendant entity’s decision making
jurisdiction.” 212 Therefore, the preliminary question in building a prima
facie case of disparate-impact discrimination is what will be measured
and how data will be compared in the disparity analysis. However, the
case law presents no clear picture of what exactly that would entail.
THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S OPINION IN DARENSBURG

III.

A. PLAINTIFFS’ PRIMA FACIE CASE OF DISPARATE IMPACT
In order to evidence a measure of disparity between subsidies per
passenger among MTC’s transit operators, plaintiffs in Darensburg
could have presented statistical evidence comparing either: (1) MTC’s
allocation of operating subsidies between bus and rail; (2) MTC’s
allocation of capital subsidies between bus and rail; or (3) MTC’s total
allocation of subsidies between bus and rail. 213 The third option boasts

211

Press Release, California Rural Legal Assistance, Inc., Latino Residents Reach Settlement
with City of Modesto and Stanislaus County on Equal Access to Municipal Services (June 30, 2011),
available
at
www.crla.org/sites/all/files/content/uploads/pressreleases/2011/063011_Modesto
PressRelease.pdf.
212
Julia B. Latham Worsham, Disparate Impact Lawsuits Under Title VI, Section 602: Can A
Legal Tool Build Environmental Justice?, 27 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 631, 689 (2000) (citing
Villanueva v. Carere, 85 F.3d 481, 487 (10th Cir. 1996) (comparing the percentage of Hispanic
students enrolled at one school with the percentage of Hispanic students in the entire school district);
Larry P. by Lucille P. v. Riles, 793 F.2d 969, 983 (9th Cir. 1984) (comparing the percentage of
African-American students in the state school system’s “educable mentally retarded” population
with the percentage of African-American students in the entire state school population)); see also
Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925, 927 n.1 (1997) (comparing
racial composition of population affected by challenged permit and racial composition of the rest of
the county); Tsombanidis v. W. Haven Fire Dep’t, 352 F.3d 565, 575 (2d Cir. 2003) (“The basis for
a successful disparate impact claim involves a comparison between two groups-those affected and
those unaffected by the facially neutral policy.”). But see Coal. of Concerned Citizens Against I-670
v. Damian, 608 F. Supp. 110, 127 (S.D. Ohio 1984) (focusing solely on the racial composition of the
neighborhoods through which the proposed highway would traverse).
213
Siegel, supra note 5, at 119.
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support from the cases discussed above, 214 but nevertheless failed to
convince the Ninth Circuit that MTC’s allocation of funding to expand
rail services resulted in a disparate impact to minority bus riders. 215
1.

The District Court’s Oversimplication of the Facts

Although the Darensburg district court observed that “comparing
transit service is more an art than a science,” 216 it found that plaintiffs’
statistics established a prima facie case under section 11135 in relation to
the discretionary funds allocated by MTC under Resolution 3434, its
strategic long-range plan for transit expansion projects, 217 but not in
relation to committed funds that were dedicated to certain uses according
to the mandates of the sources of those funds, leaving MTC little
discretion in their allocation. 218
In 2001, MTC adopted the Regional Transit Expansion Plan
(RTEP), known as Resolution 3434. 219 Plaintiffs alleged that MTC’s
selection criteria for projects funded under Resolution 3434 caused a
disparate impact. 220 The district court agreed, finding that “the evidence
showed that MTC applied different criteria to bus projects than to rail
projects.” 221 This finding did not require an intensive statistical showing,
as testimony revealed that “AC Transit was required to show that its
proposed bus projects would lure travelers out of their single occupancy
vehicles, whereas rail projects . . . were simply assumed to do so.” 222
However, the statistical evidence bolstered plaintiffs’ claim.
“[A]pproximately 94% of the Resolution 3434 project costs were for rail
projects, and less than 5% were for bus projects,” and “84.4% of
Resolution 3434 funds were dedicated to lower minority operators,
214

See, e.g., N.Y. Urban League v. N.Y., 71 F.3d 1031, 1037 (2d Cir. 1995) (per curiam)
(holding that because the underlying claim challenged the total allocation of subsidies, the district
court should have “assessed whether any measure or combination of measures could adequately
capture the impact of these subsidies upon NYCTA and commuter line passengers”); Labor/Cmty.
Strategy Ctr. v. L.A. Cnty. Metro. Transp. Auth., No. CV-94-05936 TJH (CMX) (C.D. Cal. Oct. 29,
1996), aff’d, 263 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2001) (plaintiffs allegations that total allocations of funds were
discriminatory resulted in a powerful settlement); Comm. Concerning Cmty. Improvement v. City of
Modesto, 583 F.3d 690, 704 (9th Cir. 2009) (rejecting a narrow analysis of patterns within specific
neighborhoods).
215
Darensburg v. Metro. Transp. Comm’n, 636 F.3d 511, 523 (9th Cir. 2011).
216
Darensburg v. Metro. Transp. Comm’n, 611 F. Supp. 2d 994, 1048 (N.D. Cal. 2009), aff’d,
636 F.3d 511 (9th Cir. 2011).
217
Id. at 1044.
218
Id. at 1050.
219
Id. at 1043.
220
Id.
221
Id.
222
Id.
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and . . . higher minority operators received only 8%.” 223 Therefore,
“MTC’s selection process . . . cause[d] a disparity in funding for rail
projects that on the whole are used by a lower percentage of minority
riders, as opposed to bus projects.” 224 The court held, “[o]n balance,” in
regard to Resolution 3434, that plaintiffs had shown a prima facie case of
disparate impact. 225
In regard to committed funds administered by the Federal Transit
Administration (FTA), the State of California, and regional funding
measures approved by local voters, plaintiffs alleged that MTC
effectively diverted funds from the operational costs of AC Transit to
costly rail expansion projects, “in effect starving the existing bus system
to feed the growth of capital-hungry rail,” producing a disparate impact
on high-minority-percentage operators such as AC Transit. 226 However,
the district court held that a statistical comparison “from the viewpoint of
absolute numbers of minority riders advantaged or disadvantaged by
MTC’s funding policies” presented an oversimplified picture of MTC’s
funding practices. 227
First, MTC’s role in the allocation of committed funds was
restricted by conditions placed on the receipt of those funds, with MTC’s
role in allocation largely limited to ensuring the funds went only to
projects conforming to the Regional Transportation Plan. 228 Second,
while AC Transit’s budget shortfalls were lower than any other MTC
operator, AC Transit started at a disadvantage, both because its declining
ridership produced less revenue and because it received less support from
dedicated state and local funds than did other operators, apart from any
action by MTC. 229 Third, the court likened any comparison between
different operating modes to “the proverbial apples and oranges
issue.” 230 Fourth, the court explained that “[d]efining the appropriate
223

Id.
Id. at 1044.
225
Id. However, under the burden-shifting framework of the disparate-impact analysis, the
court held that MTC had satisfied its burden in justifying its practice and that plaintiffs failed to offer
an equally effective alternative. Id. at 1051-61. This portion of the holding is not discussed here, as
the Ninth Circuit did not reach that portion of the analysis because it found the district court’s
finding of a prima facie case “clearly erroneous.” Darensburg v. Metro. Transp. Comm’n, 636 F.3d
511, 522 (9th Cir. 2011).
226
Darensburg, 611 F. Supp. at 1044-45.
227
Id. at 1048.
228
Id. at 1045.
229
Id. at 1046.
230
Id. at 1047. The court noted several factors: some operators are single-mode (i.e., only
bus) while some operate several modes (i.e., bus, historic trolleys, light rail and cable cars),
differences in short- and long-haul operations, eligibility for funding by geographical location,
operators’ ability to generate their own revenue through sales tax ballot measures, and the fact that
bus systems have lower capital costs than rail systems. Id.
224
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comparison groups to assess disparate impact is further complicated by
the Bay Area’s ‘majority minority’ population of transit users.” 231 Sixtyone percent of all riders were minorities; therefore a comparison between
the fifty-one percent minority ridership of rail operators and the sixty-six
percent minority ridership of bus operators did not reflect a disparity,
given that MTC’s Title VI reporting benchmark for analyzing disparate
impact was set at seventy percent. 232 Consideration of all of these
factors led the court to conclude that while “MTC could take at least
some additional steps to allocate committed funds in a way that would
somewhat alleviate AC Transit’s shortfalls, . . . on balance, [p]laintiffs
[had] not met their burden of showing that MTC’s funding practices
regarding committed funds [had] a significantly disproportionate
impact.” 233
In many ways, this portion of the district court’s opinion illustrates a
question similar to the one arising out of Committee for a Better North
Philadelphia. In 1988, the Supreme Court described the disparateimpact analysis as “functionally equivalent” to that in cases of intentional
discrimination. 234 This explains why the first two stages of the burdenshifting framework under disparate-impact analysis do not require proof
of intentional discrimination, but it does not “answer whether disparateimpact analysis should apply where statistical studies show a disparate
impact on minorities but the statistical studies do not, for various
reasons, give rise to an inference of intentional discrimination.” 235
This question also creates problems in cases, such as Darensburg,
where the plaintiffs’ claims involve both intentional and disparate-impact
discrimination theories. For example, on appeal, the Ninth Circuit held
that the “[p]laintiffs’ failure to establish that MTC’s conduct ha[d] a
discriminatory impact prevents any inference of intentional
discrimination.” 236 But “[i]f the prima facie case of a disparate impact
raises an inference of intentional discrimination, then how does it differ
from an intentional discrimination case built on statistics?” 237 If
statistics in a disparate-impact case must paint the same picture as
required in intentional discrimination cases, “then the disparate impact

231

Id.
Id.
233
Id. at 1051. The district court similarly dismissed plaintiffs’ claims related to the
allocation of uncommitted funds. Id.
234
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 987 (1988).
235
Adams, supra note 105, at 426 (arguing that the “pretext model” would “solve the
problem”).
236
Darensburg v. Metro. Transp. Comm’n, 636 F.3d 511, 523 (9th Cir. 2011).
237
Adams, supra note 105, at 432.
232
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analysis loses both independent theoretical meaning and practical
import.” 238
2. The Ninth Circuit’s Return to Obscurity
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed, stating that “[t]he district
court’s inference that minorities were adversely affected by the RTEP
[was] based on an inappropriate statistical measure and a logical fallacy,
and [was] therefore clearly erroneous.” 239 The court found that
plaintiffs’ statistical evidence was not an ‘appropriate measure’ for
presenting what, if any, adverse impact the RTEP would have on
minority riders, and therefore they had not “carried their burden to
establish a prima facie case of disparate impact discrimination.” 240
The court noted that the district court’s finding of a “disparity in
funding for rail projects that on the whole are used by a lower percentage
of minority riders as opposed to bus projects” was based on the statistical
comparison between the sixty-six percent minority ridership of bus
operators and the fifty-one percent minority ridership of rail operators.241
It also noted that “[t]he district court never expressly found that MTC’s
funding of rail over bus adversely affected San Francisco Bay Area
minorities,” but that the court “must have drawn that inference” in order
to find that plaintiffs had established a prima facie case. 242 The Ninth
Circuit found this inference to be based
[O]n a faulty syllogism: (1) a greater percentage of bus riders than rail
riders are minorities; (2) fewer bus expansion projects than rail
expansion projects were included in the RTEP, and bus projects

238

Id. at 433.
Darensburg, 636 F.3d at 522 (citing United States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1263 (9th
Cir. 2009) (en banc) (“[W]e will affirm a district court’s factual finding unless that finding is
illogical, implausible, or without support in inferences that may be drawn from the record.” (footnote
omitted))).
240
Id. The court then explained that because the defendant’s rebuttal burden was “a state law
issue of first impression” and because plaintiffs had failed to present a prima facie case, it need not
weigh in on any other aspects of the section 11135 claims. Id.
241
Id. at 519. Perhaps, though, the court was guilty of the same oversimplification it accused
the plaintiffs of by refusing to consider the other evidence considered by the district court in its
determination. For example, the district court’s opinion indicates that the statistics it used, in
addition to the testimonial evidence, were related to the percentage of Resolution 3434 funds
allocated among the various operators rather than the statistics the Ninth Circuit references here
related to the overall minority ridership of bus versus rail operators considered by the district court
when analyzing the allocation of committed funds. See Darensburg v. Metro. Transp. Comm’n, 611
F. Supp. 2d 994, 1044-48 (N.D. Cal. 2009), aff’d, 636 F.3d 511 (9th Cir. 2011).
242
Darensburg, 636 F.3d at 519.
239
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received a lesser percentage of requested funding than did rail
projects; (3) therefore, minorities were adversely affected. 243

Reliance on overall ridership statistics therefore failed to take into
account the particular ridership of the future rail projects. 244 Thus, in the
court’s view, the plaintiffs’ evidence was structured to illustrate any
existing disparities that may be present in the current system, while
plaintiffs’ claims actually related to future expansion projects positioned
for funding in the RTEP. 245 Therefore, the court was looking for
evidence showing that minority riders would be adversely impacted by
those future projects. 246 The court found it impossible to predict how the
expansion projects would affect future ridership without more precise
data reflecting the ridership of the planned rail expansions. 247 Hence,
“[the] court simply could not determine from Plaintiffs’ statistical
evidence whether the projects in the RTEP will benefit or harm the Bay
Area’s minority transit riders.” 248
However, this raises important questions about how future ridership
can be estimated and what the appropriate comparison population would
be. If one were to project future ridership statistics based on current
trends, it is arguable that rail expansion would magnify any current
disparities. The district court poignantly noted that “as capital-intensive
rail operators such as BART increase their fleets of rail cars, there will be
even more demand on Resolution 3434 funds for rail expansion likely at
the expense of bus services.” 249 In sharp contrast, the Ninth Circuit
noted that under the theory presented by the plaintiffs, where “the
population of bus riders contains a greater percentage of minorities than
the population of rail riders, any RTEP that emphasizes rail expansion
over bus expansion, even where such a plan may confer a far greater
benefit upon minorities than whites, would be subject to legal
challenge.” 250 This comparison highlights the differences in the courts’
analyses—the Ninth Circuit’s analysis was focused on comparisons of
minority ridership among the operators, 251 while the district court’s
analysis was based on the lack of equal standards for the allocation of

243

Id. at 520.
Id.
245
Id. at 521.
246
Id.
247
Id.
248
Id.
249
Darensburg v. Metro. Transp. Comm’n, 611 F. Supp. 2d 994, 1044 (N.D. Cal. 2009)
(internal citation omitted), aff’d, 636 F.3d 511 (9th Cir. 2011).
250
Darensburg, 636 F.3d at 521.
251
Id. at 519.
244
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Resolution 3434 funds and the resulting disparity among the allocation to
bus versus rail operators. 252
As further support for its holding that the plaintiffs failed to provide
an appropriate statistical measure, the Ninth Circuit pointed to the fact
that $9 billion of the $13.5 billion RTEP funds allocated to rail
expansion projects were sponsored, at least in part, by operators with a
majority-minority ridership. 253 The court suggested that if it were the
plaintiffs’ belief that these operators were making sponsoring decisions
to the detriment of their minority ridership, their complaint would be
better aimed specifically at those operators rather than MTC. 254
The Ninth Circuit “simply could not determine” from existing
ridership statistics “whether the projects in the RTEP will benefit or
harm the Bay Area’s minority transit riders,” 255 leaving the question of
what comparison population would present an “appropriate measure”
unanswered. In a 2011 presentation at the annual California Transit
Association conference, one of the attorneys who had represented MTC
in Darensburg expressed gratitude that he did not have to answer that
hard question. 256
Noting there are few cases factually similar to those presented in
Darensburg, the court cited Bean v. Southwestern Waste Management
Corp. as illustrative of the “importance of providing an appropriately
precise statistical measure of disparate impact.” 257 In challenging the
siting of a waste management facility in their neighborhood as
discriminatory, plaintiffs in Bean presented statistical evidence showing
a concentration of waste sites in a predominantly minority quadrant of
the city. 258 However, more precise census data showed that nonminorities lived closer to the new site, suggesting that the location may
have actually favored minorities in that regard. 259

252

Darensburg, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1043-44.
Darensburg, 636 F.3d at 521 n.3.
254
Id.
255
Id. at 521.
256
Kimon Manolius, Presentation at the California Transit Association’s Annual Fall
Conference & Exposition, Surviving Title VI Litigation: (Is This What Survival Feels Like?)
Darensburg v. Metropolitan Transportation Commission (Nov. 4, 2011) (PowerPoint presentation
available
at
www.caltransit.org/files/resources/FISCAL%20Title%20VI-Manolius.ppt)
(“Thankfully, the Court did not ask me for my thoughts on what an appropriate comparison might
be.”).
257
Darensburg, 636 F.3d at 521 (citing Bean v. Sw. Waste Mgmt. Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673
(S.D. Texas 1979)).
258
Bean, 482 F. Supp. at 679.
259
Id. at 678-69. However, future litigants must be wary of relying on census data, which are
notoriously unreliable, to illustrate any particular data set as there are very few guidelines for how
they are collected, and they are not consistent throughout the country.
253
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The Darensburg court therefore found Bean “directly applicable to
[p]laintiffs’ prima facie case” because “[i]f the court had more precise
data that would allow it to evaluate each project’s impact on transit
ridership, it could very well find that the proposed expansion plan
actually favors minorities, or harms minorities to a greater extent than
regional-level statistics may suggest.” 260 Herein lies the problem for
plaintiffs in Darensburg. This showing would require a glimpse into the
future to predict the ridership of both planned and existing transit
services when the new services are completed. Assessing population
statistics near future transit projects could presumably make that
showing, but that evidence would largely ignore the plaintiffs’
underlying claim—that future rail projects were funded to the obvious
detriment of the bus service they relied on and that MTC’s long-range
plan would aggravate that disparity.
Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit’s reliance on Bean announced the
court’s message in Darensburg to disparate impact claimants: to make a
prima facie case, plaintiffs must provide statistical evidence showing
impacts to the specific persons affected on a project level. This lesson,
however, is particularly problematic for plaintiffs such as those in
Darensburg. The court pointed out that, in absolute numbers, BART
actually serves two million more minority riders than does AC transit,
implying that future rail projects may serve to benefit minorities. 261
While minority riders do make up a greater percentage of bus riders, a
rail expansion project into areas that are predominantly minority would
in fact benefit those riders. 262 The court pointed to the example of the
MUNI central subway project that, when completed, will connect two of
San Francisco’s highest minority populated neighborhoods, Bayview and
Chinatown. 263 This point, however, still ignores the fact that AC Transit
riders faced reductions in service while there were no plans to expand
rail into plaintiffs’ neighborhoods.

260

Darensburg, 636 F.3d at 522.
Id. at 521.
262
Id.
263
Id. In large metropolitan regions with a majority-minority population, such as the Bay
Area and the Los Angeles Basin, it is possible that no set of data would present a clear picture of
disparity. Looking at cases such as these strictly through the eyes of race in the future may disguise
serious adverse effects of decisions, as the country’s population grows increasingly diverse. While
not a protected class under federal law, low-income populations may serve as a better guide to
measure disparity under agency regulations. See, e.g., Dep’t of Transp. Updated Envtl. Justice Order
5610.2(a), 77 Fed. Reg. 27,534 (May 10, 2012) (“The Order sets forth steps to prevent
disproportionately high and adverse effects to minority or low-income populations through Title VI
analyses and environmental justice analyses conducted as part of Federal transportation planning and
NEPA provisions.”).
261
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In absolute terms, looking at the ridership trends between bus and
rail in the recent past would likely present the picture painted by the
district court—if future funding continues to be dominated by rail
projects, bus service will continually decline, likely to the detriment of
inner-city minorities who are effectively denied access to rail. 264
However, as the Ninth Circuit suggested, 265 delving into the facts at the
project level for at least one of the projects funded by Resolution 3434
does not paint a prettier picture.
Resolution 3434 included $350 million earmarked for the
BART/Oakland Airport Connection (OAC) rail expansion project. 266
Concurrent with litigation in Darensburg, three parties (represented by
two of the Darensburg plaintiffs’ attorneys) filed an administrative
complaint with FTA, alleging noncompliance with Title VI when BART
sought funding under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
(ARRA) for the OAC project. 267 The facts arising out of the resulting
investigation make two important points: first, administrative complaints
filed under Title VI section 602 agency regulations may be a viable
alternative to disparate-impact litigation and, second, even if plaintiffs in
Darensburg had presented the type of statistical evidence the Ninth
Circuit sought, their claim would have been unsuccessful against MTC.
This example suggests, however, that if plaintiffs must present evidence
on a project-level basis, plaintiffs’ complaint should have been against
individual operators, as the Ninth Circuit suggested, 268 as the Title VI
violations here were attributable to BART, not MTC.269
The complaint alleged that BART failed to comply with Title VI in
connection with the OAC project by failing to prepare the required
service and fare equity analysis and therefore failed to evaluate whether
the project would have a disproportionate impact on minority and lowincome populations. 270 In response to the complaint, FTA conducted a
Title VI compliance review that revealed BART’s admitted
264

Darensburg v. Metro. Transp. Comm’n, 611 F. Supp. 2d 994, 1044 (N.D. Cal. 2009), aff’d,
636 F.3d 511 (9th Cir. 2011).
265
Darensburg, 636 F.3d at 522.
266
Darensburg, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1016.
267
Complaint Under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Executive Order 12898,
Urban Habitat Program v. Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist. (Before U.S. Dep’t of Transp. & FTA Sept.
1, 2009), available at issuu.com/transform/docs/fta_title_vi_complaint_09-1-09_final [hereinafter
OAC Title VI Complaint].
268
Darensburg, 636 F.3d at 521 n.3.
269
Letter from Peter Rogoff, Administrator, Federal Transit Administration, to Steve
Heminger, Executive Director, Metropolitan Transportation Commission, and Dorothy Dugger,
General Manager, Bay Area Rapid Transit 1 (Jan. 15, 2010), available at
www.bart.gov/docs/BART_MTC_Letter_On_OAC.pdf.
270
OAC Title VI Complaint, supra note 267, at 20.
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noncompliance. 271 While BART hastily conducted and submitted an
equity analysis to try to bring the project into compliance, MTA rejected
the analysis as still “fail[ing] to analyze whether the [p]roject’s
improvement and the service reductions would have a discriminatory
impact.” 272 BART’s subsequent “corrective action plan” was similarly
rejected because “there [was] no way the agency [could] come into full
compliance with Title VI” by the ARRA fund disbursement deadline
later that year. 273 The $70 million in ARRA funds programmed for the
project were then redistributed among other Bay Area operators,
including AC Transit, to fill operating shortfalls and maintain existing
service. 274
Just months later, amidst significant public controversy, BART held
a groundbreaking ceremony for the OAC project “after it was able, with
much help and backroom dealing by [MTC], to secure alternative
funding to replace the $70 million it lost [in] stimulus funds,” 275
including $25 million in federal dollars granted under a different
program administered by the FTA. 276 Around the same time, local
voters removed from office the BART director who had been the primary
backer of the OAC project, followed a few months later by the
resignation of the General Manager after significant pressure by the
BART Board of Directors. 277 Soon thereafter, FTA’s Office of Civil
Rights opened an investigation into MTC’s civil rights practices 278 and
ultimately found deficiencies in five of fourteen Title VI compliance
areas reviewed. 279 While the administrative complaint did not in effect
halt construction of the challenged project, it did call attention to

271

Letter from Peter Rogoff to Steve Heminger and Dorothy Dugger, supra note 269, at 1.
Id. at 2.
273
Letter from Peter Rogoff, Administrator, Federal Transit Administration, to Steve
Heminger, Executive Director, Metropolitan Transportation Commission, and Dorothy Dugger,
General Manager, Bay Area Rapid Transit 1-2 (Feb. 12, 2010), available at
transbay.files.wordpress.com/2010/02/fta_oac_02122010.pdf.
274
Bart/Oakland Airport Connector (OAC), PUB. ADVOCATES, www.publicadvocates
.org/bartoakland-airport-connector-oac (last visited Dec. 21, 2012).
275
Id.
276
Oakland Airport Connector News, BART, www.bart.gov/about/projects/oac/news.aspx
(last visited Dec. 21, 2012).
277
Bart/Oakland Airport Connector (OAC), supra note 274.
278
Press Release, Pub. Advocates, MTC Failures Spark Federal Review of Fairness Practices
(Aug. 17, 2010), available at www.publicadvocates.org/sites/default/files/press_releases/phase2
pressrelease081710.pdf.
279
FED. TRANSIT ADMIN. OFFICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS, TITLE VI REVIEW OF THE METRO.
RANS
T
P. COMM’N FINAL REPORT 16 (Apr. 2012), available at www.fta.dot.gov/documents/MTC_
compliance_review_4_9_12.doc.
272
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BART’s noncompliance with the mandates of Title VI and brought about
changes both in administration and management of the agency. 280
B. PLAINTIFFS’ FAILURE TO PROVE DISPARATE IMPACT
PRECLUDED A FINDING OF INTENTIONAL DISCRIMINATION
The Darensburg plaintiffs’ federal claims required proof of
intentional discrimination—success on the merits of those claims
required a showing that MTC’s funding decisions were not just
objectionable, but rather were attributable to purposeful
discrimination. 281 To make such a showing, plaintiffs needed to “present
evidence based upon which any reasonable fact-finder could conclude
that MTC acted at least in part because of, not merely in spite of, its
adverse effects” on the plaintiff class. 282
In cases such as Darensburg, where the challenged conduct is the
result of facially neutral policies, direct evidence of discriminatory
purpose makes the “evidentiary inquiry relatively easy,” but such
evidence is rare. 283 Therefore, proof of disparate impact, such as
evidence showing statistical disparities, may be used to satisfy the intent
requirement when that evidence provides an inference of discriminatory
purpose. 284 However, the Supreme Court has cautioned that “statistics
are not irrefutable; they come in infinite variety and, like any other kind
of evidence, they may be rebutted”; therefore, “their usefulness depends
on all of the surrounding facts and circumstances.” 285 Statistical
disparities alone are rarely dispositive. Therefore, disparate impact is
only one of several factors considered, and should supplement other
280

Similarly, while plaintiffs in Darensburg were unsuccessful in litigation, perhaps the case
achieved a measure of success by bringing attention to MTC’s lack of compliance with Title VI. See
Darensburg v. Metro. Transp. Comm’n, 611 F. Supp. 2d 994, 999-1000 (N.D. Cal. 2009), aff’d, 636
F.3d 511 (9th Cir. 2011) (pointing out that the court’s conclusion was supported in part by a recent
change in MTC’s policies that may have been brought about by the lawsuit).
281
See discussion supra Part I.B.1.
282
Darensburg v. Metro. Transp. Comm’n, 636 F.3d 511, 523 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Pers.
Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
283
Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977). The oftcited example is Yick Wo v. Hopkins, in which the statistical disparity showed that the challenged
practice involved enforcement only against Chinese individuals to their total exclusion from the
permitting scheme of the ordinance at question. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373 (1886)
(“The fact of this discrimination is admitted. No reason for it is shown, and the conclusion cannot be
resisted that no reason for it exists except hostility to the race and nationality to which the petitioners
belong, and which, in the eye of the law, is not justified.”). In Arlington Heights, Justice Powell,
writing for the Court, was careful to distinguish Yick Wo as a rarity, stating that absent such a “stark”
disparity, impact alone is not determinative of whether purposeful discrimination exists. Vill. of
Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266.
284
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307-08 (1977).
285
Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 (1977).
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circumstantial evidence, which, when considered together, may show
discriminatory intent. 286
The plaintiffs in Darensburg conceded that they had no direct
evidence of any discriminatory purpose on the part of MTC, and they
therefore relied on circumstantial evidence to argue their intentional
discrimination claims. 287 In Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing Development Corp., the Supreme Court articulated a nonexhaustive list of factors that may be illustrative for courts considering
whether the “totality of the circumstances shown by [p]laintiffs’ indirect
evidence” may give rise to an inference of discriminatory intent in
addition to disparate impact: 288
The historical background of the decision is one evidentiary source,
particularly if it reveals a series of official actions taken for invidious
purposes. The specific sequence of events leading up the challenged
decision also may shed some light on the decisionmaker’s
purposes. . . . Departures from the normal procedural sequence also
might afford evidence that improper purposes are playing a role.
Substantive departures too may be relevant, particularly if the factors
usually considered important by the decisionmaker strongly favor a
decision contrary to the one reached. . . .
The legislative or
administrative history may be highly relevant, especially where there
are contemporary statements by members of the decisionmaking body,
289
minutes of its meetings, or reports.

Despite having already concluded there were triable issues of fact as
to plaintiffs’ disparate-impact claim—therefore meeting at least one of
the factors—the district court granted MTC’s motion for summary
judgment as to the claims of intentional discrimination. 290 The court
found that the plaintiffs’ circumstantial evidence had failed to raise a
triable issue of fact under Arlington Heights because “[t]he
circumstances include[d] too many strong contradictions of
discriminatory motive that preclude drawing any reasonable inference of

286

Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (holding that disparate impact alone is
insufficient to evidence discriminatory intent absent exceptional circumstances); Vill. of Arlington
Heights, 429 U.S. at 266-68 (establishing five factors as probative of intentional discrimination: (1)
disparate impact, (2) historical background, (3) history of decisionmaking process, (4) departures
from normal substantive factors or procedures, and (5) legislative or administrative history).
287
Darensburg, 636 F.3d at 523.
288
Darensburg v. Metro. Transp. Comm’n, No. C-05-01597 EDL, 2008 WL 3915349, at *24
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2008) (referencing Vill. of Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. 252).
289
Vill. of Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 267.
290
Darensburg, 2008 WL 3915349, at *24-26.
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discriminatory intent.” 291 While it did not delve into an extensive
analysis of the factors, the court provided a poignant example of the
court’s inability to infer discriminatory intent by noting MTC’s
“treatment of the whitest of the seven major carriers, Golden Gate
Transit, almost two-thirds of whose passengers are white in a transit area
that is majority minority.” 292 Like AC Transit, Golden Gate Transit
faced “steep operating shortfalls.” 293 The court noted that in 2005, while
both transit agencies lacked the funding to cover both operating and
capital rehabilitation shortfalls, MTC provided $13.7 million in
preventative maintenance funds to AC Transit, yet did not cover any of
Golden Gate Transit’s shortfalls, forcing the agency to cut its service by
thirty-five percent and lose twenty-one percent of its ridership,
exacerbating the funding problem. 294 This fact, even in isolation, “would
strain credulity to infer that [MTC] is motivated by racial discrimination
to harm AC Transit’s minority riders by not covering operating
shortfalls, yet allows Golden Gate Transit’s largely white riders to suffer
steep cuts in service instead of covering its operating shortfalls.” 295
The Ninth Circuit affirmed but placed significant weight on its
conclusion that the plaintiffs had failed “to establish that MTC’s
challenged conduct ha[d] a discriminatory impact,” thus preventing “any
inferences of intentional discrimination.” 296 The court explained that the
“[p]laintiffs’ intentional discrimination claim relie[d] on drawing
equivalences between (1) bus riders and minorities, and (2) rail-riders
and whites, that [were] not borne out by the data.” 297 While the court’s
simplistic view here may be valid in this instance, it surely did not mean
to suggest that because plaintiffs failed to provide the correct measure of
disparate impact they are precluded from a balancing of the remaining
Arlington Heights factors.
Clearly, disparate impact alone is not enough to find constitutional
violations in agency action; it is “not irrelevant, but it is not the sole
touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination,” 298 and only a starting
point in the analysis. 299 “Though relevant,” since Arlington Heights,
“[e]ven stark racial disparities are likely to be dismissed by courts,” as
“disparate . . . impacts lack the gravity required to offset the high
291

Id. at *25.
Id.
293
Id.
294
Id.
295
Id.
296
Darensburg v. Metro. Transp. Comm’n, 636 F.3d 511, 523 (9th Cir. 2011).
297
Id.
298
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976).
299
Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977).
292
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evidentiary burden required to prove intent by quasi-legislative bodies
and administrative . . . agencies.” 300 This suggests that a weighing of the
remaining Arlington Heights factors is crucial to the analysis. For
example, a string of Equal Protection cases represents situations in which
courts have found municipalities engaging in intentional discrimination
through historic patterns of the discriminatory distribution of municipal
services, even in the absence of direct evidence. 301
CONCLUSION
In many ways, the Darensburg decision was unremarkable. Like
the Second Circuit in New York Urban League, the Ninth Circuit faulted
plaintiffs for presenting an oversimplified picture of the complexity of
the allocation of subsidies among various transit operators. 302 In both of
these cases, the plaintiffs failed to “employ an appropriate measure for
assessing disparate impact.” 303 It still remains to be determined,
however, how a plaintiff may adequately capture a picture of disparity if
it truly exists. The complexity of the facts presented in a case involving
multiple transit operators providing an array of dissimilar services makes
this task difficult, if not impossible, for plaintiffs.
The evidentiary problems associated with institutional
discrimination claims illustrate the problems faced by many
environmental justice plaintiffs. Jurisprudence in this area is focused on
the motivation of a single entity, often in the context of a single decision,
to assess whether there is a constitutional violation, in essence
legitimizing disparate effects by making the disparate-impact analysis a

300

Carlton Waterhouse, Abandon All Hope Ye That Enter? Equal Protection, Title VI, and the
Divine Comedy of Environmental Justice, 20 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 51, 92 (2009); see also
Bean v. Sw. Waste Mgmt. Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673, 680 (S.D. Tex. 1979) (holding that plaintiffs
failed to prove discriminatory intent, despite showing disparate impact of hazardous waste facility
siting); E. Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass’n v. Macon-Bibb Cnty. Planning & Zoning Comm’n,
706 F. Supp. 880, 886 (M.D. Ga. 1989) (holding that plaintiffs failed to provide evidence to support
a determination that race was a motivating factor, despite strong evidence of disparate impact);
R.I.S.E., Inc. v. Kay, 768 F. Supp. 1144, 1149-50 (E.D. Va. 1991) (holding that plaintiffs lacked the
evidence necessary to show discriminatory intent, despite the existence of a disparate impact on
minorities).
301
Waterhouse, supra note 300, at 92 (citing Dowdell v. City of Apopka, 698 F.2d 1181,
1181-82 (11th Cir. 1983); Neighborhood Action Coal. v. City of Canton, Ohio, 882 F.2d 1012 (6th
Cir. 1989); Baker v. City of Kissimmee, 645 F. Supp. 571 (M.D. Fla. 1986); Ammons v. Dade City,
Fla., 783 F.2d 982 (11th Cir. 1986); Tinsley v. Kemp, 750 F. Supp. 1001 (W.D. Mo. 1990); Midwest
Cmty. Council, Inc. v. Chi. Park Dist., 98 F.R.D. 491 (N.D. Ill. 1983)).
302
See N.Y. Urban League v. N.Y., 71 F.3d 1031, 1037 (2d Cir. 1995) (per curiam);
Darensburg v. Metro. Transp. Comm’n, 636 F.3d 511, 520 (9th Cir. 2011).
303
N.Y.C. Envtl. Justice Alliance v. Giuliani, 214 F.3d 65, 69 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing N.Y.
Urban League, 71 F.3d at 1038).
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less-than-significant part of the equal protection analysis and tasking
plaintiffs with the seemingly impossible undertaking of exposing
impermissible motives. 304 Indicative of this point is the fact that in the
thirty years since the adoption of the Arlington Heights test, the Court
has rarely found discrimination under that analysis. The problem for
environmental justice claimants, including the Darensburg plaintiffs, is
that their focus lies in the outcome of multiple government decisions that
create a disproportionate burden on these protected groups. 305 While
courts may be sympathetic to the plight of environmental justice
plaintiffs, only in the most egregious cases is impermissible government
action found. 306
It is well-established that state courts are the ultimate authority on
state law, even where provisions of state law parallel provisions of
federal law. 307 Accordingly, California courts are not bound by federal
precedent construing parallel federal text 308 and, in the area of civil
liberties, are free to provide greater protection under California law than
that afforded by the United States Supreme Court under parallel
provisions under federal law. 309 Therefore, a state court construing
section 11135 could, in the future, veer away from the analysis presented
here and provide greater protection from disparate-impacts arising out of
government action.
304

See Vill. of Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266-68 (citations omitted). The district court in
Darensburg also referenced another factor from an age-discrimination case providing that “[p]roof
that the defendant’s explanation is unworthy of credence is simply one form of circumstantial
evidence that is probative of intentional discrimination, and it may be quite persuasive.” Darensburg
v. Metro. Transp. Comm’n, No. C-05-01597 EDL, 2008 WL 3915349, at *24 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21,
2008) (quoting Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 147 (2000)).
305
E.g., Bean v. Sw. Waste Mgmt. Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673, 677-79 (S.D. Tex. 1979).
306
See id. at 679; Darensburg v. Metro. Transp. Comm’n, 611 F. Supp. 2d 994, 999-1000
(N.D. Cal. 2009) (“The [c]ourt was left with no doubt that AC Transit’s bus riders would benefit
from additional service and that many of them are burdened by fare hikes and service cuts,
hampering their efforts to get to work, medical appointments, and grocery shopping and to meet
other important needs.”), aff’d, 636 F.3d 511 (9th Cir. 2011).
307
Cf. Jankovich v. Ind. Toll Rd. Comm’n, 379 U.S. 487, 491 (1965) (“[E]ven though a state
court’s opinion relies on similar provisions in both the State and Federal Constitutions, the state
constitutional provision has been held to provide an independent and adequate ground of decision
depriving this Court of jurisdiction to review the state judgment.”); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S.
58, 62 (1967) (“Our holding, of course, does not affect the State’s power to impose higher standards
on searches and seizures than required by the Federal Constitution if it chooses to do so.”); People v.
Brisendine, 531 P.2d 1099, 1112-13 (Cal. 1975) (“[T]he Supreme Court has clearly recognized that
state courts are the ultimate arbiters of state law, even textually parallel provisions of state
constitutions, unless such interpretations purport to restrict the liberties guaranteed the entire
citizenry under the federal charter. . . . [T]he California Constitution is, and always has been, a
document of independent force. Any other result would contradict not only the most fundamental
principles of federalism but also the historic bases of state charters.”).
308
Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 940 P.2d 797, 808 (Cal. 1997).
309
Alpha Standard Inv. Co. v. Cnty. of L.A., 173 Cal. Rptr. 328, 332 (Ct. App. 1981).
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California has a long history of providing its citizens with broader
civil rights protections than those available under federal law. 310 Statutes
like section 11135 are designed to preserve the ability to challenge
institutional disparities and to require public agencies to engage in
thoughtful consideration of their actions. In recent years, while the
federal courts have narrowed the ability of plaintiffs to present
challenges alleging disparate-impact discrimination by governmentfunded programs, 311 the California Legislature has provided section
11135 as a powerful tool to address these disparities in California. 312
How powerful that avenue may be, however, will depend on future
litigation in California courts. For now, absent smoking-gun evidence of
discriminatory motive, it appears plaintiffs must re-think their litigation
strategy in complex cases such as Darensburg.

310

E.g., Cal. Dairies, Inc. v. RSUI Indem. Co., 617 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1039 (E.D. Cal. 2009)
(“California labor statutes strive to protect the minimum wage rights of California employees to a
greater extent than federal law.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Mardi Gras of San Luis Obispo
v. City of San Luis Obispo, 189 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1025 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (“The California
Constitution, and California cases construing it, accords greater protection to the expression of free
speech than does the United States Constitution.”); Perez v. Sharp, 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948) (striking
down California’s anti-miscegenation statute twenty years before the United States Supreme Court
held that anti-miscegenation statutes violate the U.S. Constitution).
311
Waterhouse, supra note 300, at 62-64 (noting the “federal courts’ all but unanimous
rejection of environmental justice claims under both the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VI” due to
the requirement that plaintiffs prove a type of “‘racial animus’ typically associated with the actions
of Bull Connor and other white segregationists”).
312
See discussion supra Part I.B.2.
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